Rising to the Challenge: How Nations are Combating Terrorism in the Sahel
The Sahel is an African region that is often defined in different ways. There are also usually differing views on which Sahel states are and which are not. In general, it is safe to say that the Sahel includes Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad and Mauritania. These states are sometimes referred to as the Sahel G5. In a broader definition, Senegal, Nigeria, Sudan, South Sudan and Eritrea can also be counted in the Sahel. The Sahel region faces several challenges that states are unable to manage. It is this inability of the states to manage their problems that allows extremist organisations to expand. As a result, terrorist groups have begun to increase in the Sahel. As of 2022, the Sahel region has recorded the most terrorism-related deaths in the world. Of course, this fact is helped by the end of the war in Afghanistan and the fact that the Taliban have become the government of that country. Regardless of the war in Afghanistan, Sahel terrorism is a danger not only to the entire African continent but also to Europe and the United States. In the region, of course, the smuggling of weapons and drugs has increased along with terrorism, but also the white meat trade. Of course, all these facts have attracted international attention. Surrounding states are worried that the instability will move to them. Western states are afraid of terrorist attacks targeting them. There also seem to be various paramilitary groups operating in the Sahel, such as the Wagner group, which find the instability convenient. All these facts and concerns have led to a variety of international responses. How did these reactions play out and how did they end up?
Historical context
The Arab Spring is a major turning point in the history of instability in the Sahel. The 2011 overthrow of Libyan leader Muammar al-Gaddafi created power instability in the northwestern Sahel and helped fuel the rise of extremist groups. This instability quickly spread to the rest of the Sahel. The fall of Gaddafi, who had been in power for 42 years, encouraged a Tuareg separatist uprising in Mali. It helped that Tuareg soldiers who had served in Libya returned to Mali. In this conflict, the Tuareg and other Islamic tribes wanted to get their territory called Azawad. Although the Tuareg had had a few past attempts at rebellion, this rebellion was better organized and also came at an opportune time when most of the Malian army had been moved to the centre of the country due to a military coup. In addition, weapons from Libya and radical Islamist groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Ansar Ad-dine also helped. Azawad forces have managed to seize cities such as Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal. Later, the leadership of Azawad territory was taken over by these radical Islamist groups and in 2013, Azawad territory was recaptured by the Malian army with a lot of help from France. However, this gave rise to a variety of extremist groups in the Sahel region, which fought not only against state governments but also against each other, and the civilian population suffered the most. It is the younger part of the population that often faced, and still faces, the choice of which radical group to join, as it is safer than not being part of one.
Groups and their goals
The first major group operating in the Sahel is Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM). This group was formed in 2017 and is an alliance of various groups into one coalition, including the Saharan branch off Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Since its formation, it has carried out a large number of attacks on civilians but also foreign counter-terrorism forces and even UN peacekeepers. Most attacks are recorded on military objects, but most casualties are civilians. The JNIM claims that their main goal is to defeat the oppressors of Muslims, to drive the occupiers out of the Sahel and to establish the rule of Islam and the Koran. They have named France and all the states that cooperate with it as the main enemy, which of course includes all the state establishments in the Sahel region. The JNIM is well able to exploit the crises in the Sahel to recruit new members and secure funding for its activities. The group mainly operates in the northern and central parts of Mali and can also be found in Burkina Faso. In recent years, there has been a clear intent by JNIM to expand its operations beyond the Sahel, as evidenced by its attacks in Togo and Benin. In the coming years, one can expect to see an expansion of the group, and therefore an increase in its dangerousness, due to the withdrawal of the French army from the region.
The Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) is the second major group operating in the Sahel. ISGS is part of the original Al-Mourabitoun group that joined the Islamic State. The other part of Al-Mourabitoun has rejoined Al-Qaeda. The organization most often and mostly targets its attacks directly at government officials. Despite their targeting of government officials, this is one of the most dangerous organisations in the Sahel. Unlike other groups in the region, ISGS does not have a coherent ideological framework and does not target influence and win over people in the region. Rather, they focus on brutal fighting and do not pay much attention to the population’s needs. The other organisations are concerned with convincing the population that their struggle is the right one and seek their support. ISGS does not look at this at all and their approach is more like that of a military occupier. On the other hand, in the areas that are under their administration, they are already starting to act like a legitimate government, and that includes helping the population who are under their control. The group’s goal is in line with the broader vision of IS and therefore the creation of a conservative Islamic Caliphate. In the areas it controls, it seeks to replace state forces with its own and bring strong regulation and punishment under Sharia law. The group mainly operates along the border between Niger and Mali. It also reaches the border between Burkina Faso and Niger.
Boko Haram is a group that originated in Nigeria in 2002. From the start, it succeeded in attracting young people without jobs and was initially peaceful. However, it then came under investigation by the Nigerian police and was found to be buying weapons and preparing for combat. Thereafter, arrests of the group’s leaders were swift, and after the death of their leader during a prison break in 2011, the group launched its first attacks. Thanks to the Nigerian army, they then quickly began to lose most of the territory that was under their influence. As a result, the group moved into the forests and began fighting in a guerrilla manner and later allied with IS. The group is often involved in various kidnappings to extract ransoms. The ISIS branch in West Africa is strongly linked to Boko Haram. Nowadays it is becoming harder to tell what Boko Haram is and what ISIS branch in West Africa is.
Many other radical groups and organisations are emerging in the Sahel, fighting each other or forming alliances. Many of these organisations have their own branches. Not to mention that the Wagner group also seems to be operating in the area in pursuit of its aims and profit. The Sahel region is therefore very dangerous for the whole world, and it is not surprising that some kind of international response to this situation was necessary.
International responses and interventions
In response to the situation in the Sahel, Un has prepared a programme to improve the situation, focusing mainly on the Sahel G5 countries. Following a decision of the UN Security Council, the programme aims to prevent the situation from spreading to the wider area. In this regard, the effort is to secure the outer borders of the Sahel region as much as possible to prevent smuggling and spillover groups into the surrounding area. It is also necessary, according to the UN, to improve judicial systems and law. This also involves strengthening the police. Of course, preventing the radicalization of the population is also a necessity. For this, humanitarian aid is currently necessary. In this regard, the support of the official G5 governments and the formation of civil society in the countries concerned is necessary. The UN is also increasing cooperation between the G5 countries and, for example, through the formation of peacekeeping forces from the countries concerned. The UN has also helped to establish a permanent G5 secretariat.
To strengthen security and justice in the G5 countries, Interpol assists local police forces. To this end, a Joint Task Force was established in 2017 to work with military and police forces to provide intelligence on threats in the region. Interpol exchanges information between 196 countries to help identify key threats and individuals of extremist movements.
Since 2012, there have been several different counter-terrorism operations carried out by foreign actors in the Sahel region. The Sahel has received a great deal of assistance from the United States over the years thanks to the Trans-Sahara Counter-terrorism Partnership (TSCTP). The United States can be seen operating to some degree in the region since 2002. The United States has operated most often in support of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and in support of the Sahel G5 grouping. To a large extent, the United States has assisted with the training of local soldiers. However, former colonial power France has been the most active in the region. In 2014, France launched Operation Barkhan, which involved the direct deployment of troops and equipment. The aim was to weaken extremist groups, particularly to damage their influence in the areas, destroy their sources of funding and give space to local security forces. However, France’s efforts were to no avail as extremist groups continued to grow stronger and the areas where the French army was present became the only zones of relative security. After a series of setbacks for France and several military coups, Operation Barkhan began to be heavily criticized. With this also came the question of whether France’s meddling was ultimately rather detrimental. As a result, relations between France and the countries of the Sahel began to cool, resulting in the gradual withdrawal of French troops from the region. Along with the French troops ended such a Peacekeeping mission called MINUSMA, which had been operating in Mali since 2013.
The European Union has also focused on the Sahel, creating the Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel in 2011. This strategy consisted of four main points. The first point, of course, was about effective governance in the state and the promotion of democracy to help economic growth. The second point is to improve communication and diplomacy between states to improve security conditions. The next point focuses, like the UN plan, on strengthening the judiciary and the police. The fourth point was to effectively prevent the spread of extremism and radicalism. However, these plans also failed to materialize and the influence that the EU had in the Sahel largely left along with the French troops. Despite this, the EU is still trying to send humanitarian aid to the area and to secure the borders as best as possible against any refugees or security threats.
At the moment, the Sahel states are trying to resolve the situation with the extremist groups through diplomacy and accommodation, but even so, there is constant fighting and war crimes are being reported by independent journalists, both by the Wagner group and by the armies of the Sahel states themselves. The Wagner group, according to some claims, has had an indirect influence on the departure of foreign forces, including the peacekeeping mission MINUSMA. Currently, Niger, which until now has US troops in the country, acts as the biggest ally of Western countries in the fight against terrorism. With the departure of MINUSMA, the Tuareg have also begun to regain the northern parts of Mali within Azawad. It is the Wagner group that is supposed to be helping the Malian forces fight Azawad.
What next?
Today, the situation in the Sahel continues to deteriorate. With the departure of France, further strengthening of some extremist groups can be expected. In the same way, the Wagner group can be expected to become more important in the region. The strengthening of radical groups in the region may then also have an impact not only on the rest of Africa but also on Europe and the US, where terrorist attacks could move in the future. It is therefore necessary for Europe to keep a close eye on its external borders and try to maintain the best information in the Sahel. The spread of radicalism in the region is unlikely to stop anytime soon. Western states should therefore come up with more effective ways to fight counter-insurgency conflicts. As far as the Sahel itself is concerned, from the point of view of the states in the region, it is best to encourage groups to fight each other in the first place and thus weaken each other. If Western states want to remain engaged in the region and try to reduce the influence of extremism, it is necessary to build infrastructure that will give young people in particular an education and, most importantly, a job. If Western countries want to use military force in the region, as things stand, small-scale interventions against specific important targets are better than directly sending in large numbers of troops. Which is largely what the Sahel states themselves are against at the moment. However, despite all this, the fact remains that the Sahel region is a major security risk for the future, which is not to be ignored.
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Source of the picture: https://www.civipol.fr/fr/projets/programme-dappui-au-g5-pour-la-securite-au-sahel-pags-phase-ii
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Written by Jan Šenfeld
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