Russian Private Military Contractors´ Presence in Latin America: Covert Russian Influence in the Western Hemisphere

The presence of Russian Private Military Companies (PMCs) in Latin America introduces new complexities to regional stability, international relations and geopolitical power dynamics. The shadowy realm of non-state actors with military capabilities occupies a middle ground between state political strategy and private business interests, which allows Russia to covertly influence events without official involvement. The activities of PMCs range from protection services and training to intelligence assistance, mostly in conjunction with Moscow´s agenda.

In the contemporary world, understanding the role of PMCs requires understanding their contribution to maintaining regime stability, security of economic interests, and expansion of covert operations in the region while challenging the status quo of influence in the American continent. The evolvement of Russian PMC activities not only threatens U.S. national security interests but also impacts the socio-political landscapes of several Latin American countries, potentially leading to increased instability and human rights concerns. So, what is the real purpose of Russian PMC deployment in Latin America, and how can the United States mitigate the threats that arise from this phenomenon?

Venezuela

Venezuela´s alliance with the Russian Federation started in the 2000s during Hugo Chavéz´s presidency. Russia was an excellent partner for Chavéz, a socialist with an anti-U.S. sentiment. It was a chance for Russia to counter American influence in this region. Pursuing Venezuelan´s self-sufficiency in military matters, Russia became a top supplier of heavy military equipment and training. When Nicolás Maduro came to power, Russia became a crucial ally due to the crippled economic situation. Providing financial aid, investments, and military advisors was important to Maduro´s stay in power. In the contemporary world, Russia heavily invests in the Venezuelan energy, raw materials, and security sector, while Venezuela provides a safe ground for Russian influence in the Western hemisphere. They also bilaterally support each other in global politics.

There have been three occasions when Russian PMC contractors have been said to be present in Venezuela. The first such occasion happened in 2017. Back then, the contractors were probably utilized by Rosneft, a Russian oil company, to provide security for their facilities and assets. During that time, Venezuela was in the middle of massive anti-government protests against Maduro and his policies. Russians thus utilized their own security contractors instead of Venezuelan security services. More Russian PMC contractors then arrived in 2019, but this time, they were tasked with providing security to Nicolás Maduro himself, again amid anti-government protests that were sparked due to a power claim from the opposition candidate. Lastly, in 2024, there is an evidence of cooperation between Venezuelan riot police and Wagner PMC.

Commonly, states use security contractors in unstable areas to protect their assets and investments. During protests and opposition uprisings, protecting key investment infrastructure is beneficial for Maduro and Russia.

However, it is highly unusual that foreign PMC contractors protect foreign officials in their home country. This situation implies the weakness of the Venezuelan regime´s control over internal security forces and matters. From the Russian standpoint, the deployment of PMC Wagner was not only to protect Maduro´s life but also to ensure that Venezuela would still be leaning towards Russia. Furthermore, Russian contractors, with utmost certainty, helped the Venezuelan intelligence services and cooperated in securing intelligence on opposition members and protesters while providing training and advisement to suppress future uprisings. In 2024, Russia and Venezuela signed an agreement regarding defense cooperation that includes arms deals, most notably „intelligence and counter-espionage cooperation“. This agreement suggests Russia plans to expand its covert capabilities in Latin America.

Furthermore, Russian PMC contractors provided training and assistance not only to official Venezuelan security forces but also to pro-Maduro militias, known as Colectivos, who are known for their brutality in cracking down on protests. This situation strongly resembles the division of internal security forces in Russia. There is the military under the Department of Defence. Then there is Rosgvardiya, who is directly responsible to the Russian president, ensuring the division of security resources for anti-coup purposes.

Regarding other activities of PMC personnel in Venezuela, engaging in international crime is probable. Russian PMC members and, namely, contractors connected to Wagner PMC have a history of criminal behavior in countries of their deployment. Though there is no direct evidence, Russian contractors operate in areas with rich resources like oil, gas, diamonds, and gold. Exploiting raw materials and smuggling became one of the revenue streams for Wagner PMC in Africa.

Cuba

The Russian-Cuban alliance, a relic of the Cold War, was solidified by the Cuban revolution in 1959. The Soviet Union, in response, became the guarantor of Cuba’s independence and security, establishing a significant stronghold in the Caribbean. This cooperation, which included financial aid, military assistance, and technological support, waned after the Soviet Union’s collapse. However, in the 2000s, it was rekindled as Russia sought to bolster its influence in Latin America and the Caribbean region.

Cuba has two main functions regarding private military contracting for Russia. It is a friendly transitional ground for further traveling to Latin America and a recruiting territory. It is a convenient logistical center because Cuba is an ally of Russia, near the United States of America, and the gateway to Latin America from the east. The Wagner PMC members deployed to Venezuela to protect President Maduro in 2019 used Havana to depart to Caracas.

Notably, Cuban citizens are active participants in Russian PMC activities. There is evidence that suggests that Cuban nationals have been recruited by Russian private military companies and intelligence officers to fight in Ukraine. Faced with heavy losses of Russian military personnel and a reluctance to mobilize, Russia turned to foreign recruitment. It offered Cubans significantly better monthly salaries and the possibility of future Russian citizenship, even for family members. Some foreign recruits ended up in international battalions, while others were deployed as members of PMC. There is evidence of Cuban contractors working under Wagner PMC. It is estimated that around 5000 Cuban military contractors have fought for Russia. Despite the Cuban government’s statement about investigating a human trafficking network that recruits Cuban nationals for war in Ukraine, it is highly doubtful that this practice was not known and supported. Subsequently, Cuba released a statement that would treat these contractors as illegal mercenaries, possibly serving long jail time if the recruited Cubans came home, which puts pressure on those already in Russia or Ukraine to stay there and fight or face the law in their home country.

Purpose of Russian Presence

The primary role of Russian PMC contractors in Latin America is to act as alternative security and military assistance providers for allied regimes. The United States has traditionally exerted its influence in Latin America through political alliances, economic aid, and military cooperation with allied countries while isolating the non-allied ones, mainly through economic and diplomatic sanctions. In response, Russia provides military training, intelligence support, and security, sometimes through Russian private military companies, to bolster the resilience of these countries against the United States´ political pressure. This is particularly crucial given the United States‘ history of efforts to install pro-American figures in power through various means. The deployment of Russian PMC personnel ensures the stability of allied regimes by providing security to government officials and oppression of the opposition, all while maintaining the ability to claim plausible deniability from Russian state officials.

The PMC personnel also help to secure Russia’s economic interests. Latin America is abundant in rare minerals, oil, and gas, critical for Russia´s economy and development. In Latin America, Russian PMC contractors provide access and security to logistical centers and mining sites to ensure financial and material profits. This arrangement also has advantages for sanctioned countries, such as Venezuela. Foreign investments secure the regime’s monetary gain, and an alliance with Russia allows the resources to be present in the market despite the sanctions.

Deploying PMC contractors also enables the expansion of Russian military power globally. The presence of a few Russian military specialists is common in many countries, even outside Latin America, to promote bilateral cooperation, but PMC members are normalizing the presence of infantry. Recently, the Nicaraguan president agreed that Russian soldiers could use Nicaragua as an intelligence base. In Cuba, Russians re-used the old soviet intelligence base, and in Venezuela, Russia obtained a long-term air and naval base.

By securing allied regimes, suppressing the opposition, investments, and access to the international market, and growing military and paramilitary presence, Russia gathered support for its goal of creating a multipolar world, which also means countering the influence of the United States in their hemisphere.

The Implications

A significant implication of Russian PMC personnel in Latin America is an encroachment of the United States´ regional influence in its hemisphere. Based on the Monroe Doctrine, the United States considers Latin America its sphere of influence, trying to deter any foreign powers from gaining hold there. The presence of Russian PMC members and their activities may slowly shift the balance of power and create a powerful position for Russia to increase its pressure in future negotiations. In the case of escalation between these hegemons, Russia could mobilize their anti-US allied countries in Latin America with the PMC personnel to diversify the conflict efforts. Even though Russia´s primary cooperation regarding defense and military affairs is with Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba, Russian companies gained a foothold in other countries like Bolivia and Peru, which may lead to the same situation.

With Russian influence growing, there is an emerging threat of destabilization. By training paramilitary groups, supporting authoritarian regimes, and enabling violent crackdowns on opposition groups, Russian presence fuels instability and repression, which leads to human rights abuses and continued social unrest. Such a situation usually results in a conflict of its own and subsequent mass migration, as in the case of Venezuela.

It is unknown how much of Latin America´s natural resources are going to the Russians due to the black market. Still, their investments and possessions of natural resources deposits are growing. It is not just about oil and gas, valuable resources such as gold and lithium are also in demand. Suppose Russia can get significant control of the deposits of those commodities in Latin America. In that case, it will be a problem in the future in terms of price fluctuations and manufacturing capabilities.

The last concerning aspect of Russian PMC presence is the increased potential for intelligence operations. Even though some Russian PMCs have recruited significant numbers of prisoners to boost the number of invaders in Ukraine, many contractors are still former members of elite Russian forces, mainly from intelligence services such as GRU, FSB, or SVR. The presence of contractors with intelligence history and connections may result in more vigorous propaganda campaigns, covert operations and increased informant recruitment.

Isolationism Is Not the Answer: What Should Be Done

This situation is disadvantageous, mainly for the United States. It calls for a more effective way to militarily cooperate with US-leaning Latin American countries, even though it is significantly harder now due to tensions regarding migration and Donald Trump´s rhetoric toward several southern countries. Colombia is still a long-term ally of the United States, and Argentina´s president, Javier Milei, has declared support for Donald Trump. Deeper military collaboration with these allied countries can support the monitoring activities of Russian personnel, whether PMC or military. Even though a few Russian military bases and hundreds of documented PMC personnel may not look like a big concern, they can quickly create significant problems, such as taking control of the essential trade routes. Furthermore, China also heavily invests in the Latin American mining industry and military cooperation. For far too long, the United States has ignored the increasing influence of its most prominent opponents in its own hemisphere. While Trump´s focus on China is not wrong, he should not underestimate the power of the growing Russian presence and its implications.

The Russian PMC personnel should be considered the same as Russian military members, with fewer rules since most are connected to state entities, mainly Russian intelligence services. US SOUTHCOM´s fleet should be strengthened to enhance military deterrence, with more intelligence and counter-intelligence abilities. This command is responsible for Enhanced Narcotics Operations and countering threats from regional and external actors and transnational crime organizations in the Caribbean Sea. While they are already tasked with countering China´s presence in Latin America, it is time to consider also Russia as an external threat to the United States´ national security. Wagner PMC and PMC Konvoy (allegedly also present in Venezuela) are already on the list of transnational criminal organizations, meaning they fall under US SOUTHCOM’s jurisdiction. This step may help with interdictions of illegal arms transports and arrests of criminals. Furthermore, joint military exercises and cooperation should be increased with allied countries, such as Colombia, to project power. It shares a border with Venezuela and provides a suitable place to base US intelligence officers from CIA, DIA or DEA and members of SOCOM, such as the 5th Special Forces Group, which is directly trained for operations in Latin America. The second country could be Guyana, which is also a US ally, even though there are strong connections to China due to investments in infrastructure. In the case of Nicaragua, such an allied country might be Salvador. The authoritative regimes of Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua, and their oppression provide excellent conditions for the recruitment of informants for US intelligence services.

The United States and its companies still have more significant investments in natural resources in Latin America than Russia. For now, the United States does not have access to the rare earth minerals in Ukraine, and it is unlikely that Russia will agree to mining on occupied Ukrainian territories. Even if President Trump tries to solve American dependence on mineral resources elsewhere, like his plan with Greenland or Canada, American companies still need to compete with Russian and Chinese investors, and their hired personnel in Latin America, otherwise they may be pushed out of business. In the extreme case, Russian PMC contractors and their covert capabilities represent a deniable option to destroy American investments. To increase self-sufficiency, there should be more investments in domestic rare earth elements refining and mining businesses in states like Alaska or California. There are several options to protect American investments in Latin America. The United States companies can hire their PMC personnel for security purposes and advocate or lobby for more vigorous diplomatic efforts. There should also be more available and affordable political risk insurance to attract other companies to gain more of a foothold in Latin America´s resources market.

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Written by Sebastian Raida

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