Zugzwang on the Nile: A project which can ignite millions of houses or a conflict

The Nile is the world’s longest river, extending more than 6,700 kilometres through a basin shared by eleven African countries and supplying several hundred million people. The current dispute concerns the allocation of its flow and directly involves three of these states: Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan. It has sharpened over the past decade for a concrete reason: the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which Ethiopia inaugurated on 9 September 2025 after more than a decade of construction. The largest hydropower project built in Africa to date, it has roughly 2.5 times the capacity of Egypt’s Aswan High Dam and a reservoir holding about one and a half times the Blue Nile’s mean annual flow. The two positions diverge sharply: for Ethiopia the dam is mainly a source of electricity and export revenue, while for Egypt, which draws an estimated 95-97% of its fresh water from the Nile, additional upstream storage is a threat to national water security.

As of June 2026, the three states have not concluded a binding agreement on water allocation. The dam is operating and supplies about 51% of Ethiopia’s electricity. Egypt, with roughly 120 million people and per capita water availability close to the threshold of absolute scarcity, has expanded its military and diplomatic presence in several states bordering Ethiopia. Negotiations have stalled, and no third party currently combines the credibility and leverage required to mediate.

The origins of the dispute

Egypt’s dependence on the Nile predates the modern state, but the immediate origins of the dispute lie in the colonial-era legal framework. A 1929 agreement between the United Kingdom and Egypt granted Cairo a veto over upstream construction. In 1959, Egypt and Sudan signed a bilateral treaty dividing the entire measured flow: 55.5 billion cubic metres (about 66%) to Egypt, 18.5 billion (about 22%) to Sudan, and 10 billion attributed to evaporation at the Aswan Dam. Ethiopia, which contributes an estimated 86% of the Nile’s water through the Blue Nile, the Sobat, and the Atbara, was neither a party nor consulted. Two conditions let this persist: British preference for Egypt as guarantor of the Suez Canal, and Ethiopia’s limited capacity at the time to build on the Blue Nile.

The GERD did not begin as a unilateral project. In 2007, the three states jointly commissioned a pre-feasibility study under the Nile Basin Initiative. The context changed in 2010, when Ethiopia and five other upstream states signed the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA, or Entebbe Agreement), proposing majority-vote governance of the basin, after which Egypt and Sudan suspended their participation. Ethiopia laid the foundation stone in 2011, while Egypt was preoccupied with the Arab Spring. A further opening came in September 2018: after a joint scientific group modelled the dam’s filling and operation, Ethiopia and Sudan were reportedly ready to sign on first filling and operating schedules, but Egypt declined, citing the need for further consultation. These episodes read either as Ethiopia proceeding unilaterally once cooperation had stalled, or as openings that not all parties took up.

The legal position has since changed. The CFA entered into force in October 2024, after ratification by Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, and South Sudan crossed the required threshold; Egypt and Sudan remain outside it. The basin now has a binding multilateral framework, but its effect is limited, since an arrangement excluding the principal downstream user cannot by itself resolve allocation.

Demography is a further driver. Egypt’s population has grown from about 26 million in 1960 to roughly 120 million in 2026, and per capita water availability has fallen by about half since 1970. Ethiopia’s population is now around 126 million, with roughly 45% of citizens, mostly rural, lacking reliable electricity. Growth in Egypt raises demand for an essentially fixed supply; the same pressure in Ethiopia strengthens the case for hydropower. The two trends push in opposite directions.

Constitutional and financial constraints

Both governments also face domestic constraints. Article 44 of Egypt’s 2014 Constitution commits the state to protecting its “historic rights” to the Nile, making concessions politically costly and hard to reconcile with a regime that recognises upstream development rights. Ethiopia’s is different: after Egypt lobbied the World Bank, the IMF, and the African Development Bank against external financing, it funded the dam domestically through government bonds, public-employee salary contributions, and diaspora donations, with more than 60 million citizens reported to have contributed. A major concession to Egyptian pressure would therefore carry its own domestic cost.

Egypt’s water position

Egypt covers more than a million square kilometres, but only about 3% is habitable. The Nile supplies roughly 95-97% of its fresh water, and by 2050 average temperatures may rise by 1.8 to 2.9°C while rainfall declines by 5 to 10%. Per capita water availability has fallen to about 500 cubic metres, the United Nations threshold for absolute scarcity, and desalination and water reuse, in which Egypt has invested heavily, remain costly, partial substitutes. Ethiopia, by comparison, depends on the Nile for only about 3% of its water and receives far more rainfall, making Egypt the most exposed of the three to any change in flow, and explaining the scale of its response.

Ethiopia’s strategic position

Ethiopia is one of the world’s most populous landlocked states. It lost direct sea access when Eritrea became independent in 1993, and regaining it has been a consistent aim; in 2024 Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed told parliament that a population approaching 150 million could not remain confined without a coastline. In January 2024, Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding with Somaliland for a 20-kilometre coastal lease and access to the port of Berbera in exchange for recognising Somaliland’s independence, producing a dispute with Somalia and linking the Nile question to Red Sea politics. Ethiopian officials present the GERD as a correction of colonial-era treaties that allocated the river’s flow downstream and none to its main upstream contributor.

The dam is now an operating asset with measurable effects. In the nine months after inauguration, it generated 13,778 gigawatt-hours, up 122% year-on-year, and it now supplies about 51% of the national grid. Domestic access rose from 44% to 54% over the construction period. Exports have grown alongside: Ethiopia earned $366 million in the most recent fiscal year and projects about $1 billion annually at full capacity, selling to four countries with Kenya being the largest, with plans to double its imports, while a second Ethiopia–Djibouti line is under construction. Each connection ties Ethiopia further into the Eastern Africa Power Pool. Egypt regards the dam as hard to constrain, since the more it is embedded in regional supply, the harder it becomes to negotiate limits on its operation.

Egypt’s regional strategy: encircling

Egypt has pursued a coordinated military and diplomatic strategy in the states around Ethiopia, with four strands. First, in August 2024 Egypt and Somalia signed a defence agreement, and by January 2025 Egyptian troops were operating in Somalia within the African Union stabilisation mission. The stated purpose is counter-terrorism against al-Shabaab; the effect is a presence on Ethiopia’s southern flank, with reports, which are not fully established, that some Egyptian-supplied weapons reached militias near the border. Second, Egypt backs the Sudanese Armed Forces against the Rapid Support Forces, reportedly running drone facilities near the border and supplying intelligence and materiel; Sudan’s alignment with Cairo follows partly from this. Third, after a trilateral summit with Eritrea and Somalia in October 2024, Egypt reportedly secured agreements to upgrade the Eritrean port of Assab for naval use, adding a presence on its northern flank. Fourth, in December 2025 Egypt agreed to develop the port of Doraleh in Djibouti, through which more than 95% of Ethiopia’s trade passes; that month its foreign minister stated publicly that Ethiopia would remain landlocked indefinitely. Together these moves are consistent with building alternatives to Ethiopian energy and influence in each neighbouring state, though several may also reflect other interests such as Red Sea security or the Sudanese war that touch the Nile only indirectly.

Sudan: the effect of state breakdown

Sudan once acted as an intermediary between Egypt and Ethiopia, but that capacity has collapsed. Khartoum initially supported the GERD, expecting flood regulation and cheaper electricity, but weak coordination with Ethiopia gradually moved its policy toward Egypt. The civil war that began in April 2023 has split the country between the SAF and the RSF, effectively suspending Sudan’s role in Nile diplomacy and displacing more than 12 million people.

Sudanese territory has also become an arena for external rivalry. The GERD lies about 30 kilometres from the Sudanese border, in Benishangul-Gumuz, leaving it physically exposed. Based on a 2026 study its saddle structure was classified as an “active geohazard hotspot”, citing about 40 millimetres of measured deformation and a reported positive correlation between reservoir filling cycles and increased local seismic activity; modelling in the same report suggests a hypothetical breach could reach Khartoum within roughly three days. This is a modelled worst case, not an assessed probability, and should be read as such, as they ‚do not predict imminent failure‘, though the absence of any joint monitoring or emergency-response protocol shows how limited cooperation has become.

External actors

Does any external actor have both the incentive and the capacity to broker a binding agreement? On current evidence, none clearly meets both. The United States has limited credibility with Ethiopia: in his first term, President Trump suspended roughly $130 million in aid to pressure Addis Ababa and suggested publicly that Egypt might destroy the dam, prompting Ethiopia to summon the US ambassador. In January 2026 he proposed restarting mediation, affirming that no state should unilaterally control the Nile, which is hard to reconcile with the 1959 agreement Egypt seeks to preserve, which had precisely that effect. A package linking guaranteed Ethiopian port access to a Nile agreement could help, but US capacity is currently absorbed by Iran, the Red Sea, and Gaza.

Other actors influence the situation without resolving it. China provided about $3 billion through state-owned firms and has largely stayed silent, retaining commercial benefits while limiting exposure. The United Arab Emirates supplies the RSF and holds influence in Sudan’s gold sector while expanding ties with Ethiopia; Sudan has filed a complaint at the International Court of Justice alleging UAE complicity in genocide. Russia, through its Africa Corps, is reported to be offered a naval base at Port Sudan and a role in Sudanese gold mining concessions in exchange for weapons. Both Ethiopia and Egypt belong to BRICS, which complicates using that forum for mediation. The pattern is consistent: external actors can influence or disrupt, but none has both the standing and the will to resolve.

Scenarios: three possible pathways

Three scenarios can be outlined. The first, and on present trends the most likely, is continuation of the status quo: the dam operates, Egypt maintains its regional strategy, no agreement is reached, and the situation holds as long as hydrological conditions stay normal. Its weakness is that it leaves no agreed procedure for abnormal conditions, above all a prolonged drought in which Ethiopia would have to weigh generation against downstream releases. Nor is it static: each month without an agreement tends to raise Ethiopia’s export revenue and deepen its grid integration, while fuel, fertiliser, and food prices linked to the Iranian crisis may narrow Egypt’s military options and raise domestic pressure for a firmer stance.

The second is escalation through proxy conflict. The Sudanese war, Egyptian arms transfers in Somalia, and the Eritrean dimension each create friction points where miscalculation could widen into confrontation, more likely through an accumulation of incidents at the periphery than a deliberate decision. The dam’s proximity to an active conflict zone raises this risk.

The third, least likely under current conditions, is a negotiated settlement. Its technical basis is reasonably well established: a 2024 study found the GERD could generate about 87% of optimal hydropower during prolonged droughts without an additional downstream deficit, given coordinated release policies, and a 2021 study found cooperative management would raise the aggregate benefits available to all three states. The binding constraint is therefore political, not technical. Though these studies model cooperative behaviour and do not show the parties have an incentive to cooperate absent a binding framework.

The resulting equilibrium

Several features stand out. The CFA is in force among the upstream states, but Egypt has not accepted it, and no court holds jurisdiction over both Egypt and Ethiopia; what exists instead is a set of competing legal doctrines, each internally consistent within its own framework. Egyptian or Egyptian-backed forces are present in several neighbouring states, and the dam stands about 30 kilometres from an active conflict zone. With Sudan, the state best placed to mediate, incapacitated by war, the dam classified as an active geohazard with no joint monitoring in place, and potential mediators absorbed by the Iran-related crisis, the conditions for a settlement are largely absent.

The resulting equilibrium is better described as a stalemate or a kind of “zugzwang” than as stability. It persists because the available options are unattractive to both governments, not because the problem has been resolved. Egypt is unlikely to sustain a major war over water, yet a negotiated concession would also be costly at home; Ethiopia is unlikely to reverse a project financed by a large share of its population. The standoff can resemble stability from a distance, but rests on the absence of acceptable alternatives rather than on agreement.

On this reading, the principal risk is not a deliberate declaration of war but gradual escalation: weapons reaching militias near the Sudanese border, a drought year forcing Ethiopia to choose between generation and release without an agreed framework, or an incident at the dam producing an unplanned response. A drought protocol, data-sharing arrangement, and coordinated release schedule already exist as technical proposals that could protect Egyptian agriculture while allowing Ethiopian generation to continue. The obstacle is not technical capacity but that the window for agreeing them appears to be narrowing as the dam becomes more embedded in regional infrastructure.

A 2024 analysis identifies the structural cause as “mutually exclusive siloed thinking”: Ethiopia treats poverty as a security problem, making hydropower a necessity, while Egypt treats water scarcity as a security problem, making upstream development a threat. When both frame the same dam as a matter of national survival from opposing directions, the room for compromise narrows sharply. A durable resolution would require a basin-wide governance mechanism built on reasonable and equitable use and the avoidance of significant harm, led by African regional institutions and shifting from bilateral bargaining toward multilateral processes. Whether that is achievable depends on political conditions that are not currently favourable. The Nile remains a resource that could in principle serve the shared interests of all eleven basin states, but only if the parties choose to manage it on that basis.

List of references

African Development Bank [AfDB] / EWS Data. (2022). Multinational – Ethiopia–Djibouti Second Power Interconnection Project, Phase II. AfDB Project Portal. Available at: https://ewsdata.rightsindevelopment.org/projects/p-z1-fa0-180-multinational-ethiopia-djibouti-second-power-int/ (accessed May 2026).

Al Jazeera. (2025, July 3). Ethiopia’s PM Abiy Ahmed says mega-dam GERD on the Nile now complete. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/3/ethiopias-pm-abiy-ahmed-says-mega-dam-gerd-on-the-nile-now-complete (accessed May 2026).

Alemnow, A. S. (2026). Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and tribunals to adjudicate the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam dispute between Ethiopia and Egypt. East African Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization, 1(1), 1–14. Available at: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18324202 (accessed May 2026).

Basheer, M., Wheeler, K. G., Ribbe, L., Majdalawi, M., Abdo, G., & Zagona, E. A. (2021). Quantifying and evaluating the impacts of cooperation in transboundary river basins on the water-energy-food nexus: The Blue Nile Basin. Nature Communications, 12, 5328. Available at: https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-021-25877-w (accessed April 2026).

Bereketeab, R. (2024). Ethiopia’s quest for a seaport: A threat to regional stability. Middle East Council. Available at: https://mecouncil.org/publication/ethiopias-quest-for-a-seaport-a-threat-to-regional-stability/ (accessed May 2026).

Chacko, S. (2026, February). Blunder on the Blue Nile: GERD’s saddle dam an active geohazard hotspot, warns report. Down to Earth. Available at: https://www.downtoearth.org.in/africa/blunder-on-the-blue-nile-gerds-saddle-dam-an-active-geohazard-hotspot-warns-report (accessed April 2026).

Chinonyerem, R. (2026, March 2). Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD): Who controls the Nile as the Iran war reshapes the region? Disruption Banking. Available at: https://www.disruptionbanking.com/2026/03/02/grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam-gerd-who-controls-the-nile-as-the-iran-war-reshapes-the-region/ (accessed April 2026).

Council on Foreign Relations. (2026, April). Power struggle in Sudan. Global Conflict Tracker. Available at: https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/power-struggle-sudan (accessed April 2026).

Dziadosz, A., Delrue, M., & Laguna, M. P. (2026, February 2). Egypt’s drone deployment on border raises stakes in Sudan’s civil war. Reuters. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/egypts-drone-deployment-border-raises-stakes-sudans-civil-war-2026-02-02/ (accessed May 2026).

Elhag, A., & Fishman, B. (2025). Renaissance dam comes online: US mediation role needs clarity. Washington Institute. Available at: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/renaissance-dam-comes-online-us-mediation-role-needs-clarity (accessed May 2026).

Endaylalu, G. A., & Arsano, Y. (2024). Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam project controversies: Understanding the role of worldviews and nexus. African Anthropologist, 22(2), 215–247. Available at: https://doi.org/10.4314/aa.v22i2.7 (accessed May 2026).

Enterprise AM. (2025, December 29). Egypt establishes foothold in Ethiopia’s trade lifeline through Djibouti port pacts. Available at: https://enterpriseam.com/logistics/2025/12/29/egypt-establishes-foothold-in-ethiopias-trade-lifeline-through-djibouti-port-pacts-2/ (accessed May 2026).

Ethiopian News Agency [ENA]. (2026, May 2). Ethiopia doubles power generation in seven years, moves to Africa’s leading energy hub: EEP. Available at: https://www.ena.et/web/eng/w/eng_8762790 (accessed May 2026).

Gavin, M. (2020). Trump’s dangerous rhetoric toward Ethiopia is indicative of a larger problem. Council on Foreign Relations. Available at: https://www.cfr.org/articles/trumps-dangerous-rhetoric-toward-ethiopia-indicative-larger-problem (accessed May 2026).

Guldogan, D. (2026). US ready to resume Egypt-Ethiopia mediation on Nile river water sharing: Trump. Anadolu Ajansı. Available at: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/us-ready-to-resume-egypt-ethiopia-mediation-on-nile-river-water-sharing-trump/3801838 (accessed May 2026).

Holleis, J. (2025). Why is Egypt bolstering ties with Somalia now? Deutsche Welle. Available at: https://www.dw.com/en/why-is-egypt-bolstering-ties-with-somalia-now/a-75958140 (accessed May 2026).

Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques [IRIS]. (2018, February). Observatoire Défense & Climat: Rapport d’étude n°5, Afrique de l’Est – Fiche Égypte. Available at: https://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/RE5-Egypte.pdf (accessed May 2026).

International Water Management Institute [IWMI] / ReWater MENA. (2022, October 14). Egypt and Middle East: Reusing water urgently needed. Available at: https://rewater-mena.iwmi.org/in-the-press/egypt-and-middle-east-reusing-water-urgently-needed/ (accessed May 2026).

Khansa, M. (2025, July 27). Five reasons why the UAE is fixated on Sudan. Peoples Dispatch. Available at: https://peoplesdispatch.org/2025/07/27/five-reasons-why-the-uae-is-fixated-on-sudan/ (accessed May 2026).

Mehariw, M. M. (2026). Beyond Egypt’s historical narrative: The completion of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and its hydro-political implications on the Nile region. International Journal of Water Management and Diplomacy, 9.

Mohammed, S. (2025, December 26). Egypt’s original mania: The Hewett Treaty and the peak of the illusion. Horn Review. Available at: https://hornreview.org/2025/12/26/egypts-original-mania-the-hewett-treaty-and-the-peak-of-the-illusion/ (accessed May 2026).

Mohammed, S. (2026, March 30). Egypt’s boomerang effect: The collapse of the counter-terrorism consensus in Somalia. Horn Review. Available at: https://hornreview.org/2026/03/30/egypts-boomerang-effect-the-collapse-of-the-counter-terrorism-consensus-in-somalia/ (accessed May 2026).

Mwaura, B. (2026, May 22). Kenya to double power imports from Ethiopia amid rising electricity demand. Dawan Africa. Available at: https://www.dawan.africa/news/kenya-to-double-power-imports-from-ethiopia-amid-rising-electricity-demand (accessed May 2026).

Musvanhiri, P. (2026). Deaths, dollars, disputes: Ethiopia’s GERD mega-dam. Deutsche Welle. Available at: https://www.dw.com/en/deaths-dollars-disputes-ethiopias-gerd-mega-dam/a-73919375 (accessed May 2026).

Negash, K. (2026, May). Ethiopia’s flagship dam doubles power output, supplies half of country’s electricity. Bantu Gazette. Available at: https://bantugazette.com/ethiopias-flagship-dam-doubles-power-output-supplies-half-of-countrys-electricity/ (accessed May 2026).

Smith, A., Nugroho, K., & Adam, A. A. (2025, June). Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF). International Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities Invention, 12(6), 8635–8639. Available at: https://doi.org/10.18535/ijsshi/v12i06.04 (accessed May 2026).

Somalia Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2024). Official statement on the trilateral summit between Somalia, Eritrea and Egypt. Available at: https://web.mfa.gov.so/official-statement-on-the-trilateral-summit-between-somalia-eritrea-and-egypt/ (accessed May 2026).

Ternafi. (2025). Egypt: Ethiopia will remain landlocked until judgment day. Mesob Journal. Available at: https://mesobjournal.com/post/egypt-ethiopia-will-remain-landlocked-until-judgment-day (accessed May 2026).

Toto, E. (2026, February 6). Ethiopia’s renaissance mega-dam fuels energy hopes and regional anxiety. Mongabay. Available at: https://news.mongabay.com/2026/02/ethiopias-renaissance-mega-dam-fuels-energy-hopes-and-regional-anxiety/ (accessed April 2026).

Webuild. (2025). Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) inaugurated. Available at: https://www.webuildgroup.com/en/media/press-releases/grand-ethopian-renaissance-dam-gerd-inaugurated/ (accessed May 2026).

Wheeler, K. G., Hall, J. W., Sadoff, C. W., Aerts, J. C. J. H., et al. (2024, December). Cooperative filling and operating strategies for the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam can mitigate downstream risks during prolonged droughts. Communications Earth & Environment, 5.

Whittington, D. (2024). The long shadow of the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement. Water Policy, 26(9), 859–874. Available at: https://doi.org/10.2166/wp.2024.035 (accessed May 2026).

Worldometers. (n.d.). Egypt population. Available at: https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/egypt-population/ (accessed May 2026).

Younes, A. (2025). Report: Sudan offers Russia military base in exchange for gold and weapons. Asharq Al-Awsat. Available at: https://english.aawsat.com/arab-world/5215430-report-sudan-offers-russia-military-base-gold-exchange-weapons (accessed May 2026).

Zerihun, A. Y. (2014, January 28). Article 44 of Egypt’s Constitution: Codifying historic wrongs on the Nile. Available at: https://zenileabbay.wordpress.com/2014/01/28/article-44-of-egypts-constitution-codifying-historic-wrongs-on-the-nile/ (accessed May 2026).

Source of the picture: https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/water-conflict-egypt-and-the-great-ethiopian-renaissance-dam/

 

Written by Daniil Shiraliev

358