EU and the strengthening nationalist narratives on Instagram
Nationalist narratives are becoming more visible on Instagram across the EU, but they do not all look the same. Some posts openly oppose immigration and the EU or claim to “defend European civilisation” by so. Others use a softer and more polished message– they present the nation as a close-knit community under threat from migrants, minorities, political elites, gender equality policies or “Brussels”. This second form matters especially on Instagram because attractive visuals and positive language can make exclusionary ideas feel familiar, respectable and easier to share.
Instagram is central to this dynamic because it combines wide reach, visual communication and personalised content recommendation through the Feed, Explore, Reels and Suggested Accounts. In the EU, roughly two thirds of the population aged 16–74 use social networks, and in 2025 Instagram had one of the highest numbers of average monthly active users amongst other social media platforms.
What exactly is being examined
In this analysis, “nationalist narratives” do not refer to every expression of patriotism. Relevant posts are those that repeatedly do four things:
- present the nation as a morally unified “we”;
- portray “the others” as foreign or out of place;
- claim that the nation is under threat;
- and call for defence, renewal or “taking back control”.
In the European context, these messages often overlap with nativism—the belief that the state should mainly serve the native population—along with support for strong authority, opposition to immigration, demands for greater national control over the EU and claims that national or European civilisation must be defended.
Kakavand describes the far right’s core ideas as a combination of nativism and authoritarianism. Research published in KOME then shows how Instagram turns those ideas into recognisable visuals: flags, national emblems, historical symbols, sharp divisions between “us” and “them”, and direct calls for followers to act.
It is also important to distinguish between openly hostile messages and softer nationalist communication. Sophia Messini found clear differences in Instagram communication among far right leaders during the 2024 European Parliament elections. For example, Kyriakos Velopoulos built his Instagram communication strongly on anger, fear and disgust, while Giorgia Meloni relied more on trust, optimism and national pride. This “softer” version is politically significant because it can move nationalist content closer to the mainstream debate and may also make them less likely to attract platform moderation.
Here, democratic resilience means a democracy’s ability to withstand pressure and adapt without losing free political competition, equal rights, pluralism or public trust. This understanding reflects both current research and the approach behind the European Centre for Democratic Resilience. It is useful because the health of a democracy depends on more than whether elections continue to take place. It also depends on whether different groups can participate as equals, institutions remain trusted and citizens can debate political choices without entire communities being treated as threats.
Why Instagram specifically?
Instagram is suitable for nationalist and radical-right actors for several reasons. First, it is visual: photographs, carousels, Stories and especially Reels allow political messages to be mixed with lifestyle, emotion and personal identity.
Second, it is heavily recommendation-based: Meta itself explains that content in Feed Recommendations, Explore, Reels Chaining and Suggested Accounts is ranked according to predicted interest and engagement, while recent interactions, content similarity, popularity and geographical relevance all play a role .This precisely makes Instagram an excellent environment in which simple, emotional and visually powerful messaging works.
Third, Instagram currently has a significantly high reach in the EU where mass audiences are at stake. According to the Transparency Reports by Meta, the average number of active Instagram users every month in the first half of 2025 had climbed over 40 million in the largest MS such as Germany, France or Italy. In Germany, this represented about 67,3 % of the adult population aged 18+, in France around 79,7 % and in Italy roughly 82,5 %. This shows that Instagram is not merely a “youth” platform, but a space where younger voters, influencers and mainstream politicians meet.
Fourth, Instagram blurs the boundary between politics, entertainment, identity and community. Nangle and d’Haenens that far-right communication on the platform does not rely only on openly hateful material. It also uses humour, nostalgia, wholesome-looking images and stories about an appealing way of life. These formats can make more extreme worldviews seem normal and socially acceptable. Kakavand similarly argues that social media platforms undeniably shape how far-right messages are produced and spread today. Instagram is therefore more than another place to publish campaign content. Its design allows messages to reach large audiences, be copied easily and connect quickly with accounts, communities and trends.
How do nationalist narratives gain reach on Instagram?
One of the most frequently used mechanisms is visual framing. Instagram gives priority to images, short videos, faces, dramatic scenes and familiar symbols. This makes politics easier to personalise and turn into an emotional story. A complex debate about migration can become a short clip showing border pressure or disorder, followed by a leader promising to “defend the nation”. For example, a debate about national sovereignty can be reduced to a flag, a rally, a map or a candidate speaking directly to the camera. Messini’s study of far-right leaders during the 2024 European elections found that exactly simple language and emotionally charged images were used together to stress national values, cultural identity and promises of economic and social stability.
Instagram’s recommendation systems add another layer of reach. The platform does not simply store posts in the order they were published; it ranks and recommends them. Meta’s transparency pages explain that AI systems help decide what users see in Feed recommendations and Reels.
This can carry engaging posts beyond an account’s existing followers. It does not prove that the system favours one political ideology. However, messages built around outrage, fear, humour, personal closeness or a clear symbol are more likely to hold attention and prompt a reaction. Monitoring of the 2024 European election cycle by the Foundation for European Progressive Studies and Democracy Reporting International found that far-right posts aimed at young people achieved the highest average engagement, while toxic content on Facebook and Instagram generated more interactions.
Hashtags, creators and political influencers can extend that reach even further. Hashtags connect an individual post with broader conversations, searchable communities and clusters of campaign content. A message from one account can therefore become part of a much larger narrative when it appears alongside similar posts under the same labels. Creators and influencers are also increasingly important. Studies of the 2024 European Parliament election show that political actors are treating cooperation with influencers as a deliberate part of campaign strategy. The Council and the Commission have also recognised that influencers shape what people see and consume online, and that this can have broader social effects, including effects on democracy. This is especially relevant for younger audiences, who often encounter politics first through social media rather than through traditional news or official party communication. In this context, political messages may appear less openly partisan when they are shared by creators, public figures, or lifestyle oriented profiles instead of official party accounts.
Another way of amplifying influence is through paid promotion and micro-targeting. Political advertisers have used platform tools to reach specific groups of users with tailored political messages. The EU Political Advertising Regulation responds by requiring political advertisements to state clearly who paid for them, how much was spent and which audience was targeted when targeting or ad-delivery tools are used. Meta also had transparency rules for advertisements about social issues, elections, or politics in the EU before deciding to stop allowing this type of advertising in the EU from October 2025. This decision limits one important channel of paid political amplification. However, it does not stop political content from spreading through organic posts, shared clips, influencer-style support, or issue-based content that circulates without formal sponsorship.
Instagram is also part of a wider flow of information across platforms. Political narratives rarely begin and end in one place. A message may first appear on one platform, be repeated by influencers, move into Instagram Reels and later enter news coverage or wider political debate. Democracy Reporting International’s election monitoring, together with its reporting on Hungary, shows how organised networks help narratives travel between platforms. In Spain, DRI found that more extreme material moved towards Telegram, where moderation was weaker. In Hungary, coordinated messages spread across several platforms through connected accounts and organised networks. This means that content visible on Instagram should not always be treated simply and as isolated. In many cases, it is only one part of a broader campaign environment in which the same narrative moves across several platforms and audiences.
Country patterns across Poland, Hungary, Italy, France, and Sweden
The five countries examined below show both common patterns and important differences. Across all of them, political actors repeatedly focus on migration, cultural threat, resentment
towards elites, national sovereignty and nostalgia for an earlier social order. What changes is the tone and presentation. In Italy and France, polished and reassuring communication helps nationalist actors appear legitimate and mainstream. In Poland and Sweden, sharper messages about migration and sovereignty generate strong engagement. Hungary shows how organised influencer networks and a media environment close to the government can greatly increase a narrative’s reach.
Poland provides a clear example of strong engagement among younger users. In the sample monitored by FEPS, the Confederation Liberty and Independence alliance published only 20 youth-related posts, fewer than some other Polish parties such as Lewica and Koalicja Obywatelska. Yet Konfederacja achieved the highest average number of interactions per post. Its youth-focused content attacked political opponents, questioned the EU’s economic role and used strong anti-immigration messages that appealed to young voters attracted to nationalist and Eurosceptic politics. The case shows that posting more often does not necessarily make a campaign more effective. A small number of sharp, emotionally resonant posts can outperform a much larger volume of less focused content.
On the other hand, Hungary demonstrates the importance of organized amplification. Horváth et al. describe the Megafon Központ (Megafon Center) as a pro-government political influencer network using significant resources to spread hostile narratives, warning that the model is easy to copy elsewhere in Europe. Political Capital’s 2024 research also shows how the “war or peace” message dominated Hungary’s European election campaign. Fidesz presented itself as the protector of peace and stability, while accusing its opponents of leading the country towards war. This showcases that the nationalist story cannot be separated from Hungary’s media system, government-aligned networks and the resources used to amplify it.
The case of Italy shows how nationalism can be mainstreamed through positivity rather than panic. Messini finds that Giorgia Meloni’s Instagram strategy during the 2024 election period emphasized optimism, trust, national pride, and historical references rather than overt aggression.. DRI’s Italy case adds a concrete campaign moment: on 28 April 2024, Meloni announced her candidacy for the European Parliament and encouraged supporters to write “Giorgia,” reinforcing hyper-personalisation and a “woman of the people” image even though she could not ultimately take the seat. The nationalist message was therefore carried through intimacy, personalization, and patriotic reassurance.
Similarly, while analysing France, Messini finds that Marine Le Pen’s posts during the 2024 pre election period balanced criticism with positive language and messages designed to build trust, while largely keeping fear in the background. Bonansinga describes this strategy as “visual de-demonisation”: professional and everyday images are used to make Le Pen appear ordinary, credible and suitable for government. The purpose is to distance her from the radical image long associated with the French far right. For democratic resilience, the concern is not limited to openly inflammatory content. Exclusionary politics can also become normal gradually when it is presented through calm language, respectable visuals and a carefully managed public image.
Sweden shows how a low volume of posts can still produce a strong security-focused message. FEPS found that the Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna) published relatively little youth targeted content during the 2024 European Parliament campaign but achieved by far the highest average engagement per post in Sweden. Their most successful material focused on
national sovereignty, strict immigration policy and public security. The slogan “My Europe Builds Walls” brought migration, criminal gangs and Islamists into one simple visual story about danger and protection. DRI also documented Swedish campaign videos that portrayed migrants and people of colour as disorderly or threatening. The Sweden Democrats gained less at the ballot box than some observers expected, but the communication frame itself remained powerful and highly visible.
The main democratic risk therefore lies not in a single Instagram post, but in the repeated exposure to exclusionary ideas. Memes, Reels, lifestyle content and trusted creators can gradually make extreme views appear normal or even seem like common sense. This weakens democratic resilience by deepening polarisation, undermining trust in institutions, putting pressure on minority rights and reducing space for constructive debate.
Young people are particularly relevant because they are highly active on social media and often engage strongly with far-right content. Although Instagram-specific evidence on rural, urban and linguistic-minority audiences remains limited, the broader pattern is clear: narrowly defining national belonging makes citizenship less equal and democracy less inclusive. Instagram does not create nationalist politics, but its design can make these narratives more visible, appealing and socially acceptable.
The question therefore is: At what point do repeated extremist messages stop appearing extreme and start becoming an accepted part of everyday political debate and are our societies today capable of resisting this „soft propaganda“?
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source of the picture: OpenAI. (2026). EU and the strengthening nationalist narratives on Instagram [AI-generated image]. ChatGPT
Written by Rebecca Bednářová
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