From gangsters to soldiers: Militarization of CJNG

The evolution of Mexican drug trafficking gangs from loosely connected criminal groups into sophisticated, hierarchical, militarized organizations has fundamentally changed the landscape of organized crime. Among Mexican cartels, Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) became a prime example of the systematic employment of military tactics, high-end weaponry, and propaganda to ensure its dominance in Mexico.

The militarization of criminal organizations is not a new phenomenon. Still, CJNG´s transformation into a virtually paramilitary organization, with the strategic goal of not only profiting but also governing its territories, marks a significant escalation in the war on drugs.

By exploring CJNG´s structure, weaponry and gear, training, and tactics, while not forgetting the reasons and consequences of militarization, this paper answers the research question: How militarized is CJNG?

Militarization of drug trafficking organizations

The militarization of drug trafficking organizations in Mexico can be traced to the fall of their Colombian counterparts, Medellín and Cali Cartels. Even though there were efforts against drug production and smuggling from the United States in the late 1960s and 1970s, the rise of Mexican drug trafficking organizations as global actors started after the fall of their Colombian counterparts, Medellín and Cali Cartels, in the 1990s. Mexican cartels filled the power vacuum and demand for narcotics.

The leading drug trafficking organization in Mexico in the 1980s was the Guadalajara Cartel, which fragmented after the arrest of its leader, Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo. The fragmentation meant fierce competition for smuggling routes and territory, increasing violence and bloodshed.

In 1997, the Gulf Cartel employed defectors from GAFE, Mexican special forces, as enforcers, traffickers and bodyguards, signifying the first larger-scale event of merging military training and tactics with organized crime. These deserters later founded Los Zetas. Their military expertise increased sophistication and capabilities, forcing other cartels to adopt similar strategies to stay relevant in the drug business.

The continuous militarization of drug trafficking organizations increased in the 2000s, especially during President Calderón´s initiative against organized crimes, due to the need for innovation to survive clashes with the Mexican Army, State and Federal Police. This resilience in the face of state intervention is a testament to the gravity of the situation.

Drivers of the militarization

Competition for territory and market

Control over territories and smuggling routes, known as plazas, is crucial for drug trafficking organizations´ financial stability and survival. Territorial control provides access and command over trafficking routes and production areas, increasing their operations‘ security and economic stability. The need for power and security requires drug trafficking organizations to adapt and innovate, ensuring that they would not lose their ground in clashes with rivals or self-defense groups. Knowledge of the latest combat tactics, state-of-the-art weaponry, or modern technologies also provides opportunities for aggressive expansion of their operations. Well-trained enforcers and modern weaponry give cartels not only a secure environment to produce and smuggle narcotics but also other illegal money-making activities such as extortion of local businesses, enforcement taxes, and exploitation of local resources.

State intervention

The militarization of drug trafficking organizations has been significantly influenced by the state´s aggressive approach to countering drug smuggling and production operations. Deployment of the armed forces alongside state and federal police forced cartels to enhance their capabilities to stay operational, especially from the 1990s, when President Calderón made armed forces responsible for counter-narcotics operations. This change in power dynamic led cartels and state forces into an arms race, which turned ordinary gangsters with small arms into trained paramilitary operatives wielding high-caliber weapons and explosives.

Arms trade

The arms trade is the primary enabler and also fuel for militarization. The primary sources of the cartels´ weaponry are illegal imports, especially from the United States and Central and Eastern Europe. Relatively lax gun control laws in border states like Texas or Arizona allow corrupted American citizens, double citizenship holders, or cartel smugglers to obtain weapons in the United States and transport them to Mexico. Approximately half of the guns seized from cartels by armed forces and law enforcement come from the United States. Another quarter comes from Europe. This illegal trade does not contain only small arms but also assault rifles such as AK-47 or AR-15, high-power sniper rifles, and machine guns.

Central and Eastern Europe is the second hot spot for arms deals with Mexican drug trafficking organizations. Romanian, Czech, Belgian, Italian and Austrian weapons have been found and seized from cartel members. The tactic is similar to smuggling from the United States. Citizens of European countries with legitimate permits buy guns and then sell them to the smugglers that deliver them to Mexico. There have also been reports of legitimate shipments meant for Mexican armed forces and law enforcement that were rerouted to the cartels by the armoury company employees.

Technological innovation

Drug trafficking organizations owe much of their transformation from criminals and gangsters to paramilitary-style organizations to the innovation of technology. Nowadays, the biggest cartels have not only the same weaponry as some states, but they also share many technological innovations.

In the last year, the most prominent innovations are drones, primarily unmanned aerial vehicles. These drones have several purposes. They can be used as vehicles to smuggle narcotics across borders or rugged terrain. Transport drones can carry several kilograms of drugs, providing cartels not only with more secure shipping but also with security for the members. Drones are also used for defensive and offensive surveillance. In the last few years, there has been a spike in drone sightings near the United States border with Mexico. Their operators were not only smuggling drugs but also looking for the movement and positions of American law enforcement personnel, as well as searching for weak points in the border´s defense.

As the use of drones increased, so did the countermeasures. There have already been reports that cartels wield counter-unmanned aerial systems (CUAS) technology for protection against law enforcement. CUAS refers to a range of technologies and systems designed to detect, track, and neutralize unauthorized drones, providing cartels with a means to protect their operations from aerial surveillance and potential attacks.

Drug trafficking organizations have expanded their cyber capabilities. The cyberspace is used not only to sell drugs and launder money through cryptocurrency. Hackers working for cartels have already deployed spyware that allows them to target journalists, politicians, and activists. American drones that are tasked with border surveillance have been hacked and their GPS navigation disrupted.

To securely transport and deploy their members, cartels started to armor their vehicles. Commercial pick-ups, tractors, and SUVs are usually outfitted with thick steel plating and equipped with high-caliber machine guns to create “narco tanks”. To protect these vehicles from drones, “cope cages” have been installed on some. “Cope cages” are protective structures made of steel bars designed to shield the vehicle’s occupants from aerial attacks, particularly from drones.

Corruption

Corruption plays a pivotal role in driving the militarization of cartels. It enables access to weapons, intelligence, operational freedom and security. The role of corruption in law enforcement forces ensures that illegal technologies and weaponry get into Mexico without intervention. There have been several cases when cartels have paid off the United States federal employees. Most cases on the American side of the border involve Customs and Border Protection officers. Greed and fear fuel the corruption of law enforcement in Mexico, even in the highest levels of administration, ensuring that narcotics can be smuggled out of the country and weapons with money can be brought in.

Implications

Tactical capabilities and modern weapons result in an escalation of violence, especially along smuggling corridors, disputed territories, and state borders. It gives cartel members confidence and an objectively better chance to survive and win clashes with state forces and other rivals, ultimately reducing the reasons to behave peacefully when profits and territories are to be taken.

Furthermore, militarization enabled cartels to challenge state authority and its monopoly of violence. Be it through the corruption of officials, infiltration of law enforcement, or violent confrontation. CJNG is known for its drone attacks against police vehicles and stations. Mexican state authorities usually lose most of their control over cartel territories, enabling cartels to become the unofficial and unelected enforcers of the order. They collect taxes, patrol the streets and pursue dissent members and activists while acting as the ultimate governing authority, effectively blurring the line between crime and insurgency.

CJNG has been notorious for its violence during the takeover of new territories without attempting any social intrusion. Unlike some other cartels, CJNG relies on brutal violence, intimidation and coercion when forcing Mexican citizens to comply, sometimes outright carrying out minor depopulation campaigns. Their “taxes” are said to be much higher than those of other cartels, while they are also careful not to bankrupt businesses. This situation creates significant regional instability, intertwining more legal businesses with organized crime.

Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG)

Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación emerged in the early 2010s as a splinter group from Milenio Cartel due to the power vacuum created after the arrest of Óscar Orlando Nava Valencia. Initially located in the state of Jalisco and under the governance of Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, also known as “El Mencho”, it became one of the most violent drug trafficking organizations using paramilitary means while employing quasi-governance over seized territories. In 2021, CJNG was present in 27 Mexican states while dominating seven of them, more than any other Mexican drug trafficking organization.

Hierarchy and structure

CJNG is often described as hyper-militarized and stands out even among other big cartels. Their hierarchy and structure are akin to the military. Most cartels consist of groups and factions with certain autonomy to make decisions, leading to conflicts within cartels. CJNG is structured differently; it takes a more vertical approach. The hierarchy of CJNG starts with “El Mencho” at the top, acting as the central brain behind cartel activities. His commands are passed down to lieutenants and, from them, to foot soldiers. Unlike other cartels, each group of CJNG is somewhat disconnected from the others.

Like armed forces and law enforcement, there are groups of cartel members with specific skills. Probably since 2017, CJNG has had its drone unit. Called “Operadores Droneros,” this unit is tasked with intelligence gathering, surveillance, reconnaissance, ambushes, and assassinations.

Another known unit of CJNG is “Grupo Élite”, acting as the cartel’s offensive armed wing. This group is probably the main fighting force against rivals while invading other territories. It is also the main subject of the CJNG propaganda due to its tactical equipment and “military-style” image. For the protection of “El Mencho”, there is “Fuerzas Especiales Mencho”.

Other than “Grupo Élite,” there are several more fighting groups in CJNG. “Grupo X” is tasked with fighting rival groups in Michoacán. In the states of Mexico, Hidalgo, Chiapas, Tabasco, Puebla, and Veracruz, there is “Operativo Barredora”. Furthermore, “Grupo Deltas”  operates in Guadalajara, “Grupo Élite de Reacción Inmediata”, alias GEDRI, is stationed in the north of Jalisco at Los Altos region, “Braso Armado Del 15” is located in the south and southeast of Jalisco. In the Costa Sur region, there is “Gente Del Mencho,” and in the northern parts of Jalisco “CJNG 2000”.

Training and tactics

The recruits of CJNG undergo three months of basic training. In these training camps, they learn how to assemble and disassemble weapons, handle them safely, and drill basic fire positions. There is also psychological training. Recruits are forced to endure physical pain through torture and deal with discomfort to prepare them for possible injury during future confrontations. Training is guided not only by members of CJNG but also allegedly by members of Mexican law enforcement, former American soldiers including Special Forces, Guatemalan “Kaibiles” Special Forces, Israeli citizens, and Colombians experienced in guerilla warfare. There is also evidence that CJNG members conduct close quarters battle training.

The violent actions, apart from random killings and assassinations, are undertaken primarily by one of the armed wings or groups. Land combat usually involves the use of “narco tanks” and overwhelming firepower, with armed wing members acting as “shock troops”. In the case of air attacks, CJNG revolutionized, among drug trafficking organizations, the use of drones with attached explosives.

CJNG is known for its capabilities in psychological operations and propaganda. Like other cartels, CJNG members use “narco mantas,” banners with messages usually targeted at civilians or rivals. Furthermore, there is a high social media presence. There are several types of CJNG social media content. Firstly, CJNG portrays itself in a positive light. CJNG members published videos calling for the protection of innocent citizens from violence or giving away aid, goods and toys for children. The second type of content is threats. CJNG posts videos, usually with heavily armed and tactically equipped foot soldiers threatening either the Mexican government or their rivals to intimidate them. This type also includes videos of torture and killings as well as pictures of corpses. Lastly, there is glamourization of the narco lifestyle. Flashing money, valuables, and women. This type of content serves as a recruitment tool along with narco-corridas, celebratory songs about drug smugglers.

Equipment and weaponry

CJNG members have developed a military-style arsenal of weapons. Among the most used firearms, there are variants of assault rifles like AR-15, SCAR and AK-47/AK-74, sometimes equipped with under-barrel grenade launchers. Machine guns are also common, primarily American M60s and M249s or variants of Russian PKMs for foot soldiers, while CJNG “narco tanks” have been equipped with M2 Browning machine guns or even M134 Minigun. Regarding long-range capabilities, CJNG is known for using .50 caliber rifles. For anti-material purposes, CJNG members wield RPG-7s, RPG-22s and RPG-27s. Air strikes are carried out by 3DR Solo Quadrocopters and variants of DJI drones equipped with explosives.

As for tactical gear, the members of the armed wing groups wear tactical vests and kevlar helmets, as well as other protective gear like tactical ballistic glasses, tactical gloves, and kneepads. There is also the presence of bulletproof kevlar vests and night vision goggles. The tactical vests usually carry a “CJNG” patch. Some CJNG members wear the patch of their armed wing group, as well as some specialized positions, like drone operators, wear patches of their occupation. Uniforms are used, but primarily for propaganda purposes.

CJNG “narco tanks” are made of pickup trucks, tractors, dump trucks or SUVs equipped with thick steel armor, in some cases, painted with camouflage coating. It has been equipped with machine guns of various calibers or high-caliber sniper rifles. There have also been cases where “narco tanks” have been equipped with firing ports, heavy duty ramming bars or anti-drone cages.

What about the future?

With its operations, structure, weapons and equipment, training and tactics, the CJNG earns its designation as hypermilitarized. This phenomenon represents a significant challenge for internal Mexican authorities and extends beyond Mexican borders. Narco culture is deeply entrenched in Mexican society, which means that this problem requires pragmatic solutions, mainly targeted at the institutional weaknesses of Mexico and its problem with corruption. Even though there is no immediate solution to this problem, Mexican authorities and their allies have few choices.

There should be an internal commitment to tackle corruption inside law enforcement, federal and local government and armed forces. “The Search Bloc” that was tasked with hunting down Pablo Escobar in Colombia serves as an example of a dedicated man whose corruption is highly unlikely due to their personal losses to criminals. A similar unit might be created, trained, and deployed, at least on the community level, and maybe even cooperate with local self-defense groups as informants to detain and prosecute corrupted individuals.

Another essential task is the tightening of arms trafficking, especially from the United States. Even though there are already cooperative programs between American and Mexican law enforcement regarding the cross-border transport of weapons, the United States should improve its border security and detection capabilities. Universal background checks should be mandatory when it comes to purchasing weapons.

Community-centered work, especially targeted at teenagers, might provide them with other opportunities to be financially stable than joining the cartels. Another critical aspect is cooperation of international actors like Europol or Interpol. Greater emphasis on the harmfulness of drugs and associated violence might enable these actors to disrupt cartels´ alliances and financial networks.

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Written by Sebastian Raida

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