Where Climate Change Meets Conflict: Insights from the Lake Chad Basin

The Lake Chad region, spanning Niger, Nigeria, Chad, and Cameroon, stands as a textbook example of how environmental degradation intertwines with security crises. The lake’s long-term shrinkage has steadily undermined the livelihoods of local populations dependent on fishing, herding, and farming. This has not only deprived them of their primary sources of sustenance but has also fueled the rise of radical militant groups such as Boko Haram, which pose a severe threat to civilians while simultaneously obstructing any developmental initiatives pursued by these states or by international actors aiming to stabilize the region.

In the context of the climate crisis, similar scenarios may unfold in multiple regions, especially where states lack sufficient capacity to suppress non-state armed groups and where economies are heavily reliant on the primary sector. Understanding why and how Lake Chad’s desiccation contributes to regional destabilization offers valuable insights for preventing comparable crises in the future. This raises a critical question: How does the shrinking of Lake Chad escalate security threats, and how effectively is the international community responding?

THE CHANGING GEOPOLITICAL ROLE OF LAKE CHAD

Lake Chad used to represent one of the most vital natural and economic pillars of Central Africa. Around 5 000 BC, it ranked among the largest Saharan lakes, covering about 361,000 km² with depths reaching up to 160 meters. Natural fluctuations in water levels were part of its history, yet by the late 19th century, the lake’s decline had taken on a wholly new, dramatic dimension, because the lake began shrinking faster than ever before. According to data from the European Space Agency, its surface area has decreased by more than 90 % since the 1960s. This unprecedented transformation is driven by several factors: long-term rainfall reduction and higher evaporation rates, rising demand for freshwater among millions living in the basin, and the development of irrigation systems.

The importance of Lake Chad for local populations cannot be underestimated. or generations, it provided food security, enabled sea transport, and facilitated regional trade. Its retreat, however, triggered a chain reaction. Fish stocks and crop yields plummeted, leading to massive livelihood losses for thousands of families and, ultimately, to widespread economic collapse across the area. Residents were forced to seek alternative means of survival—often in environments devoid of stable or legal opportunities. This economic decline unfolded against a backdrop of chronically weak state institutions. The countries surrounding Lake Chad are characterized by fragile governance, under-resourced security forces, and limited capacity to deliver basic public services. Ineffective state presence transformed vast stretches of territory into so-called “lawless zones.” Here, communities feel abandoned and entirely unsupported by central authorities.

Such power vacuums are readily filled by non-state armed actors. They provide not only material or financial incentives but also basic forms of political and social organization, substituting for absent state structures. This creates the paradoxical situation where radical, often violent groups deliver what governments fail to provide. Today, the Lake Chad area is home to roughly 17 million people, more than 10 million of whom rely critically on international humanitarian assistance. Poverty, resource scarcity, and hopelessness have fostered radicalization and strengthened militant recruitment pipelines, worsening security conditions while obstructing any prospects for long-term development.

THE RISING INFLUENCE OF BOKO HARAM

Boko Haram (its name can be translated as “Western education is forbidden”) emerged at the turn of the millennium in northern Nigeria. Initially, it presented itself as a religious-political movement denouncing corruption, injustice, and the perceived moral decay of ruling elites. In its early years, the group remained relatively moderate and even enjoyed some public support because it articulated widespread frustrations over state dysfunction and prolonged social marginalization of the region. Over time, however, it evolved into one of the deadliest terrorist organizations on the African continent. Its central aim became the overthrow of the Nigerian government and the establishment of an Islamic state governed strictly by Sharia law.

The pivotal turning point in Boko Haram’s trajectory was the 2009 killing of its founder, Mohammed Yusuf, by Nigerian security forces. Instead of weakening the movement, this act fueled its radicalization and militarization. The group abandoned relatively non-violent forms of protest and embraced open armed struggle against the state and its perceived allies. Leadership soon passed to Abubakar Shekau, who steered Boko Haram toward a harsher anti-Western stance while forging closer ties with global jihadist networks such as al-Qaeda. A major demonstration of this transformation occurred in 2011, when Boko Haram launched a suicide car bombing against a United Nations facility in Abuja, killing 23 people and injuring more than 80. This attack marked the group’s leap from a local insurgency to an organization capable of targeting international institutions. Since then, its violent activities have become a daily reality for inhabitants of northeastern Nigeria and gradually for communities in neighboring countries. From 2014 onward, Boko Haram systematically terrorized civilians: assaults frequently targeted Christian communities, police forces, schools, aid workers, and political representatives. One of its most infamous crimes was the abduction of 276 schoolgirls in the Nigerian town of Chibok in April 2014. To this day, many have not been freed; some were forced to convert to Islam or marry their captors.

Current estimates suggest Boko Haram controls significant territory in northeastern Nigeria while also projecting power into border areas of Cameroon, Chad, and Niger—an area of about 51,800 km². Its influence extends beyond military actions: the group levies taxes, regulates population movements, and in some areas functions as a de facto local authority. Membership is composed largely of young, unemployed, and impoverished men who often join not from ideological conviction but from economic desperation. According to the European Institute of Peace, individuals in this region typically turn to extremist organizations out of coercion, despair, or the need for basic survival. Recruitment is not always voluntary. A 2022 report by the UN Office of the Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict documented 862 serious violations against children in the region, including forced conscription into armed groups.

HUMANITARIAN AID

The ruthless effects of climate change and the geopolitical crossroads of cultural spheres make the Sahel region (stretching from Senegal in the west to Eritrea in the east) strikingly similar across multiple states. Each faces a comparable array of security challenges. For this reason, the UN, in cooperation with national governments and external partners, has launched the Sahel+ strategy, which also targets stabilization in the Lake Chad basin, where none of the affected states can manage the ongoing crisis alone. Chad, for instance, continues to suffer from an extremely fragile health system, as highlighted by Humanitarian Action. The country has been burdened by recurring epidemics of infectious diseases such as cholera, measles, hepatitis E, and dengue fever in 2024 alone. These risks are highest precisely in lake zones and borderlands where armed clashes and mass population displacements are most frequent. Forecasts suggest that the humanitarian situation is likely to deteriorate further in coming years, necessitating increased international support. Without direct humanitarian aid, affected communities often resort to destructive survival strategies such as joining armed groups – closing the vicious cycle where environmental degradation and livelihood loss directly feed other security threats.

To counter these dynamics, numerous international actors provide humanitarian and development assistance. Such aid has flowed into the region since the early 1980s with remarkable continuity. For example, in February 2025, the World Bank approved $170 million through the International Development Association, primarily aimed at modernizing infrastructure (improving rural access to markets, schools, and healthcare facilities) and promoting gender inclusion in the labor market. Its key goal is to reduce economic vulnerability, a core driver pushing communities toward armed or extremist structures. he European Union similarly justifies its growing support through the nexus of climate risks and migration flows. In 2025 it allocated €74.5 million to manage refugee influxes from Sudan and to prevent outward migration from Chad. Alongside these, several individual states have strengthened their contributions. Norway increased its support in 2023 to 730 million NOK, while Germany in 2024 earmarked another €100 million for the Sahel and Lake Chad basin.

The international community thus regards the Lake Chad crisis not only as a humanitarian disaster but also as a factor accelerating terrorism and armed conflict. Yet it is important to stress that financial injections alone have not halted the destabilization cycle. For more than 50 years, foreign aid has flowed to Chad without resolving the crisis. While such assistance alleviates immediate suffering, it has failed to build long-term community resilience to violence and food insecurity, leaving the structural causes of the conflict largely unaddressed.

FUTURE SCENARIOS

As mentioned, several African states are grappling with similar crises today. International aid, however, has not helped them overcome these challenges and the problems appear to be deepening. According to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, between 2017 and 2018, Islamist violence spread to a fifth region. Today, hubs of such movements can be found in Somalia, the Sahel, the Lake Chad basin, North Africa, and northern Mozambique. The same institution reports that since 2021, the death toll from militant Islamist violence across the continent has risen by 60 %. The Lake Chad basin remains among Africa’s three most dangerous regions, with nearly one in five deaths caused by such attacks.

The effects of global warming further aggravate the situation. The latest World Meteorological Organization (WMO) report on Africa confirms that extreme weather events are worsening food insecurity and forced displacement. The year 2024 became the second warmest in recorded history, with the continent’s average temperature exceeding the long-term (since 1990s) mean by 0.86 °C. Projections suggest that while southern Africa will continue to suffer devastating droughts, eastern Africa will increasingly face torrential rains and widespread flooding. Both extremes will threaten food security and, much like the Lake Chad case, act as catalysts of instability.

CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The lessons from Lake Chad are unambiguous: humanitarian assistance alone is insufficient, as it cannot eliminate the structural roots of the problem. The critical priority is to strengthen state institutions systematically (especially in countries likely to face greater security threats in the future) so they can effectively support and protect their populations. This entails the development of long-term climate adaptation strategies designed to reduce communities’ reliance on increasingly unreliable natural resources. Equally vital is the creation of sustainable livelihood alternatives, particularly for young men who otherwise remain highly vulnerable to militant recruitment. If such steps are not pursued, environmental degradation and political fragility will continue to serve as catalysts of armed conflict, not only in Central Africa but across the continent. The Lake Chad crisis should therefore be understood not merely as a humanitarian catastrophe but as a warning sign and a valuable source of knowledge – offering lessons that can inform preventive strategies against similar crises in the future.

 

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Source of the picture: https://trendsresearch.org/insight/terrorist-groups-in-lake-chad-and-water-security/

 

Written by Michaela Konopásková

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