The Baltic storm: Russia’s destabilization strategy and its impact on the Nordic and Baltic states

The European security situation has changed fundamentally over the past decade.  Russia, perceiving NATO enlargement as an existential threat, responded with the  annexation of Crimea in 2014 and a subsequent escalation of hybrid operations  combining disinformation, cyber-attacks, economic pressure, and an undeclared military  presence in neighboring states. These activities led the European Union to impose  economic and individual sanctions and accelerated security reforms in individual  member states. The war in Ukraine, which began in February 2022, brought about  a fundamental breakdown in virtually all relations between the EU and Russia and  significantly increased strategic uncertainty in the region. This conflict also led to the  accelerated expansion of NATO to include Finland (2023) and Sweden (2024) and  changed the geopolitical environment of Northern Europe. At the same time, the Kremlin’s  hybrid pressure, including manipulation of public opinion, cyberattacks, election  interference, and economic destabilization, has become a key challenge for all Alliance  states. 

In response to these threats, the importance of cybersecurity, media literacy, and defense  against disinformation as tools of resilience is increasing. Countries in the region,  including the Czech Republic, Finland, Sweden, and the Baltic states, must therefore  adapt to new conditions that combine the military, civilian, and information dimensions  of conflict. 

The main question addressed in this analysis is How the Russian Federation adapted its  hybrid warfare arsenal in the Nordic-Baltic region in 2024–2025, shifting from influence based operations to kinetic and disruptive actions, and what strategic adjustments NATO  and regional states must make to build eIective deterrence and resilience against  Russian destabilization.  

Redefining the threat below the threshold of war 

The current security situation on NATO’s northern flank is defined by a calculated and  intensifying „shadow war“ waged by the Russian Federation. This campaign deliberately  takes place in the gray zone between peace and conflict with the aim of achieving  strategic goals without provoking a conventional military response under Article 5 of the  North Atlantic Treaty. The Baltic Sea has become the primary laboratory for testing and  refining Russia’s evolving toolkit. This is not a series of isolated incidents, but a coherent  and escalating campaign, as evidenced by a report by the US Helsinki Commission, which  has mapped nearly 150 Russian hybrid operations on NATO territory since 2022. 

This shift goes beyond the traditional definition of hybrid threats—the coordinated use of  military and non-military, covert and overt means to exploit systemic vulnerabilities. The  period 2024–2025 represents a qualitative change in this doctrine. Systematic attacks on  critical infrastructure, electronic warfare, and information operations are not random but  represent a deliberate strategy. This strategy is a direct response to two key factors: first, 

Russia’s failures in conventional warfare in Ukraine, which are forcing it to open a second,  asymmetric front; and second, the strategic shock caused by Finland and Sweden joining  NATO. This move has turned the Baltic Sea into a „NATO lake“ and demanded a Russian  counter-reaction. 

This new strategic reality is also reflected in o]icial Russian positions. According to  analyses by the Jamestown Foundation, the Russian Foreign Ministry now perceives the  Baltic states as an „irreversible center of military conflict,“ indicating a hardening of  strategic consensus in Moscow following NATO’s expansion. Intelligence companies  such as Recorded Future explicitly link the escalation of hybrid threats to the 2025 NATO  summit and actions related to Ukraine, creating a clear causal relationship between  Western policy and Russian asymmetric retaliation. This approach is not merely  a temporary tactic; Finland’s Security and Intelligence Service (SUPO) predicts an  increase in Russian hybrid activities even after the war in Ukraine ends, suggesting that  this is a long-term strategic shift. This increase in the number of attacks since 2022  reflects a deliberate policy of escalation, rather than a series of random events. The hybrid  campaign is thus a calculated e]ort to impose costs, test defenses, and regain strategic  initiative in a region where Russia has su]ered a significant geopolitical setback. 

The Kremlin’s Arsenal: A Multi-Domain attack on Nordic-Baltic security 

Russia’s strategy manifests itself in a coordinated attack across multiple domains, with  each tactic designed to maximize disruption while minimizing the possibility of direct  attribution. In 2024–2025, this arsenal became bolder, targeting the physical and digital  infrastructure that underpins the functioning of Nordic and Baltic societies. 

Sabotage at sea 

Critical underwater infrastructure (CUI) has become a prime target. Systematic attacks  on submarine cables and pipelines represent a significant escalation. The damage to the  Balticconnector gas pipeline in October 2023 was not an isolated incident, but part of  a broader pattern of attacks on subsea cables and energy infrastructure in the region  between November 2024 and January 2025. These actions are intended to demonstrate  the vulnerability of the highly interconnected economies of the West and to cause psychological impact and economic disruption without overt military confrontation. 

A key element of this tactic is plausible deniability. Russia uses its „shadow fleet“—aging  tankers and cargo ships that operate with their transponders turned o] or falsify their  identities—as well as third-party civilian vessels to complicate direct attribution. The  investigation into the damage to the Balticconnector gas pipeline focused on the Chinese  container ship Newnew Polar Bear, which lost its anchor in the area, illustrating how  civilian incidents can be used to cover up potentially hostile actions. The discovery of  a massive torn anchor near the damage is key evidence of this tactic, which makes  it di]icult to distinguish between accident and deliberate sabotage. 

Weaponizing the airwaves 

Another front in Russia’s hybrid warfare is electronic warfare, specifically the systematic  jamming and spoofing of GPS signals. In 2024–2025, these operations have become 

increasingly frequent, a]ecting both civil and military aviation as well as maritime  transport in the Baltic Sea. A report submitted to the International Civil Aviation  Organization (ICAO) highlighted significant disruptions to civil aviation in early 2025,  including flight diversions and a temporary return to older navigation methods. These  operations have become part of everyday reality, posing a direct challenge to operational  safety and testing NATO’s resilience and response capabilities. This campaign is not mere  harassment; it represents a deliberate form of electronic warfare aimed at demonstrating  Russia’s ability to disrupt key civilian and military systems. 

Cognitive front (exploiting social divisions) 

The Kremlin’s information war has evolved from mass propaganda to more sophisticated,  hyperlocal, and tailored disinformation campaigns. These operations target specific  vulnerabilities, particularly Russian-speaking minorities in the Baltic states, with the aim  of undermining trust in democratic institutions and weakening social cohesion. 

Case studies from elections in Estonia (2023) and Lithuania (2024) show how troll  accounts and manipulative narratives were used to spread lies about systemic  discrimination against Russian-speaking voters, for example by questioning the integrity  of electronic voting, with the aim of reducing minority turnout and influencing perceptions  of the elections and trust in democratic institutions. These campaigns fall on fertile  ground, as evidenced by SKDS opinion polls, which reveal a significant di]erence  in attitudes toward the war in Ukraine. Moreover, this cognitive front is developing  technologically. In 2025, concerns were raised about Russian propaganda websites  potentially influencing AI systems, highlighting emerging risks in the information domain.  At the same time, campaigns are emerging that use artificial intelligence to create fake  journalist profiles and spread disinformation, representing a new technological frontier  in this domain. 

Weaponizing migration as a hybrid tactic at borders 

A classic hybrid tactic repeatedly used by Russia and its ally Belarus is the  instrumentalization of migration. The organized migration crisis on the Finnish-Russian  border at the turn of 2023 and 2024, when hundreds of migrants from third countries were  deliberately transported to border crossings without valid documents, forced Finland to  close its entire eastern border. 

This operation was designed to achieve several goals at once: to exhaust the resources of  the Finnish border guard and asylum system, to test the security of the new NATO  member’s borders, to create internal political pressure, and to stir up far-right and anti-migration sentiment throughout the European Union. Finland’s legislative response  in the form of the adoption and subsequent extension of the Border Protection Act  (the so-called „pushback law“) is a prime example of how states are forced to adapt their  legal frameworks to cope with this specific type of pressure. 

Russia’s strategy deliberately blurs the lines between the civilian and military spheres. It uses military means (electronic warfare) against civilian targets (aviation), civilian  assets (commercial ships) to achieve military-strategic goals (damage to CUI), and  vulnerable people (migrants) as a weapon to overload civilian systems. In this way, Russia 

exploits the legal and ethical frameworks of the West, which traditionally maintain  a clearer separation between these spheres, and forces NATO and the EU to develop  responses that bridge the gap between law enforcement, civil preparedness, and military  defense. 

Russia systematically transported migrants from third countries to the borders, leading  to their complete closure. This approach demonstrates a coordinated hybrid strategy. 

Since late 2023, several key incidents illustrate the breadth and escalation of Russia’s  hybrid tactics. In October 2023, the sabotage of the Balticconnector gas pipeline between  Finland and Estonia highlighted the vulnerability of undersea energy infrastructure. The  investigation pointed to external interference involving a commercial vessel, underlining  the fragility of critical maritime assets. 

At the same time, in late 2023 and throughout 2024, Russia and Belarus orchestrated the  instrumentalization of migration on the Finnish border by transporting migrants from third  countries without valid documents. This forced Finland to close its entire eastern border,  demonstrating how migration can be weaponized to drain resources, generate political  pressure, and test the resilience of a new NATO member. 

Parallel to these developments, Russia intensified disinformation operations across the  Baltic states, particularly targeting Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia and Latvia.  These campaigns questioned e-voting systems, spread narratives about “Russophobia,”  and sought to depress minority voter turnout while polarizing society. 

In late 2024 and early 2025, a series of undersea cable damages occurred in the Baltic  Sea, especially near Sweden, Finland, and Estonia. While attribution remains contested,  many of these incidents coincided with the presence of Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet,”  raising concerns about deliberate sabotage of data and power infrastructure. 

From 2024 into 2025, electronic warfare became another front: GPS jamming and  spoofing originating from Kaliningrad and other Russian areas increasingly disrupted civil  and military navigation in the Baltic region and over Poland, Finland, and Sweden. This frequent interference posed direct risks to aviation and maritime safety, testing NATO’s  ability to respond to gray-zone threats. 

Most recently, Russia has begun experimenting with new technologies, including the  infiltration of AI chatbots and language models through propaganda websites, particularly  targeting users in Nordic languages. This innovation reflects an e]ort to legitimize  disinformation, spread it more e]iciently, and bypass traditional media filters. 

Taken together, these episodes demonstrate that Russian hybrid activities are not  isolated incidents but parts of a coherent long-term strategy. The trend shows a gradual  escalation—from sabotage of undersea infrastructure, to the weaponization of migration  and disinformation, to electronic warfare and AI-driven influence campaigns— underscoring both the intensity and growing sophistication of Russia’s hybrid warfare  toolkit.

Nordic Shield: Building coordinated regional defense 

In response to Russia’s escalating hybrid campaign, the Nordic and Baltic states, together  with NATO and the EU, have embarked on building a multi-layered defense. This „Nordic  Shield“ combines military deterrence, strengthening national resilience, and strategic  steps to limit Russian influence, making the region a laboratory for innovative approaches  to whole-of-society defense. 

NATO’s maritime response 

The launch of NATO’s Baltic Sentry operation in January 2025 was a direct response to the  wave of sabotage against undersea infrastructure. Its main task is to strengthen  surveillance, situational awareness, and deterrence against hostile actions targeting CUI  in the Baltic Sea. The operation, likened to a „security camera for the Baltic Sea,“ involves  the deployment of frigates, mine countermeasure vessels, maritime patrol aircraft, and  new technologies such as maritime drones to monitor suspicious vessels in real time. 

Although Baltic Sentry is a significant step forward, its e]ectiveness faces certain  limitations. At present, it is more of a „reinforced vigilance activity“ of limited duration  than a permanent operation, and questions remain about the number of permanently  dedicated assets. The success of the initiative will depend on the willingness of allies  to provide su]icient resources and transform it into a permanent deterrence mechanism. 

National resilience models 

The region has become a hub for innovation in social resilience, with each country  developing its own specific model based on historical experience and threat perception. 

Finland applies a „comprehensive security“ model that is deeply rooted in the concept of  total defense. This whole-of-society approach integrates authorities, the business sector,  non-governmental organizations, and citizens in a joint e]ort to ensure the functioning of  vital societal functions in all circumstances. The strategy was updated in January 2025 to  reflect the changed security environment and to emphasize the ability to respond  e]ectively to disruptions and crises. 

Sweden has reestablished the Psychological Defense Agency (MPF), whose primary task  is to coordinate and develop society’s ability to counter hostile information influence. The  agency focuses on strengthening the resilience of the population through education,  media literacy, and critical thinking, thereby ensuring a more robust information  environment. 

Estonia, as a global leader in digitalization, concentrates on cyber resilience. Its  cybersecurity strategy for 2024–2030 highlights the goal of creating a „cyber-aware  society,“ developing a strong „cyber shield“ to protect digital services, and pursuing  proactive international cooperation to shape a secure cyber environment. 

Latvia has adopted a multi-layered model that formally recognizes the information space  as a domain of national defense. This approach combines government-led strategic 

communication with an active civil society ecosystem, including volunteer networks such  as the „Baltic Elves,“ who play a significant role in actively refuting disinformation online. Lithuania, in response to increasing hybrid threats, established a new military Cyber  Defense Command in January 2025. This institution centralizes the planning and  execution of operations in cyberspace, while in parallel the country is implementing the  EU’s NIS2 directive to strengthen cybersecurity across key sectors and to enhance the  resilience of critical infrastructure. 

Disconnecting from the past 

A historic milestone in strengthening regional resilience was the complete disconnection  of the Baltic states from the BRELL electricity grid, controlled from Russia, which took  place on February 8, 2025. This step ended decades of energy dependence and  vulnerability to political pressure and manipulation of energy supplies by Moscow.  Synchronization with the continental European grid represents a significant strengthening  of the region’s strategic autonomy. 

However, this achievement also creates new vulnerabilities. In the short term, the states  are forced to rely on „island mode“ operation, and in the long term, on physical  connections to Europe, such as the LitPol Link and the planned Harmony Link cables.  It is precisely this critical infrastructure that is now becoming a prime target for Russian  sabotage operations, requiring increased protection and diversification, including  investment in decentralized energy sources such as renewables and microgrids. 

Although the Nordic and Baltic states are introducing innovative models of societal  resilience, these national approaches have not yet been fully integrated into a seamless  regional defense structure. Russia can exploit gaps between di]erent national legal  frameworks, institutional responsibilities, and response doctrines. A CEPA think tank  analysis notes that although the Baltic states are „far ahead of many Western European  countries,“ they „lag behind in cooperation“ and joint monitoring could be improved. The  very commissioning of the report by Jens Stoltenberg, which is to present  recommendations for strengthening Nordic-Baltic cooperation, is an implicit admission  that the current level of integration is not su]icient to face the increased threat. While individual nations are strengthening, the connective tissue between them is another  frontier for building resilience. 

At the same time, it is implementing the EU’s NIS2 Directive to strengthen the  cybersecurity of key sectors and increase the resilience of critical infrastructure. The  overview clearly shows that each country is developing its own model of resilience based  on historical experience and specific threats. The common denominator  is an emphasis on society-wide defense, but di]erent approaches create opportunities  for Russia to exploit gaps in regional coordination. This underscores the need for deeper  integration and shared planning within NATO and the EU. 

Building a Resilient Northern Flank 

The analysis clearly shows that Russia’s hybrid campaign against the Nordic and Baltic  states is not a temporary phenomenon, but a long-term strategy aimed at destabilizing,  dividing, and deterring NATO’s northern flank. Future developments are likely 

to be characterized by further escalation, with Russia increasingly combining cyber,  electronic, and kinetic sabotage to cause systemic disruption. The goal is to test NATO’s  decision-making cycles and the ambiguity of Article 5, proving that the Alliance is unable  to respond e]ectively to aggression that remains below the threshold of a conventional  military attack. The period before and after the NATO summit in The Hague in June 2025  represents a particularly high-risk window for such activities. To build a truly resilient  northern flank, it is necessary to move from reactive measures to a proactive and  integrated strategy. 

One key step toward this goal would be to transform NATO’s Baltic Sentry initiative from  a temporary activity into a permanent maritime operation with a dedicated command  structure, building on the Task Force Baltic (CTF-Baltic) headquarters in Rostock. Such  an operation should include larger, rotating forces with surface, sub-surface, and air  assets, shifting the Alliance’s posture from deterrence based on detection—essentially  a “security camera” model—toward deterrence by denial, where hybrid attacks can be  prevented rather than merely observed. 

At the same time, Nordic and Baltic cooperation should be strengthened through the  creation of a joint cell for the fusion of intelligence information on hybrid threats. Building  on the anticipated findings of Jens Stoltenberg’s report, the NB8 (Nordic-Baltic Eight)  countries could integrate real-time intelligence from national agencies on threats such  as cyberattacks, GPS jamming, disinformation, and critical infrastructure interference.  Establishing a unified regional threat picture would make it possible to attribute attacks  more quickly and coordinate responses more e]ectively, addressing the current  fragmentation of national approaches. 

Another essential task is to enhance the resilience of critical infrastructure across both  public and private sectors. The European Union, in coordination with NATO, could adopt  a Critical Infrastructure Resilience Directive that extends beyond the existing NIS2  framework. Such a directive would introduce legally binding minimum physical and cyber  security standards for operators of critical infrastructure, mandate regular cross-border  stress tests and rapid repair exercises and establish clear accountability in cases  of security negligence. 

Finally, resilience must also extend to the cognitive domain. Regional states should move  from reactive fact-checking toward proactive defense of the information space.  Expanding models such as Sweden’s Psychological Defense Agency could help develop  preventive “pre-bunking” campaigns to inoculate populations against Russian  disinformation. Equally important is the long-term support for civic initiatives such  as the Baltic Elves, which have proven e]ective in countering online propaganda  at the grassroots level. As Latvia’s experience demonstrates, credible Russian-language  media alternatives are indispensable to prevent Russian-speaking minorities from being  drawn into the Kremlin’s information ecosystem. 

Only by integrating these military, informational, and societal measures can the northern  flank of NATO evolve from a vulnerable frontline into a coherent, resilient shield capable  of withstanding the full spectrum of hybrid threats.

 

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Source of the picture: https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2025/05/05/fortifying-the-baltic-sea-natos-defence-and-deterrence-strategy-for-hybrid-threats/index.html

 

 

Written by Barbora Burjaková

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