Security Risks of Conspiracy Movements in the European Information Space and the Eroding Trust in EU Institutions

Over the past decade, conspiracy movements have become an increasingly important part of the European information space. What used to be viewed as a fringe phenomenon limited to obscure internet forums has gradually moved into mainstream public debate, political discourse, and even electoral campaigns. Narratives claiming that the EU secretly undermines national sovereignty, manipulates public opinion, or intentionally restricts citizens’ freedoms now circulate widely across Europe. This development is no longer just a communication problem or an online trend. Conspiracy movements increasingly represent a broader security challenge with direct implications for democratic stability, social cohesion, and public trust in institutions.
The issue became particularly visible during periods of crisis. The COVID-19 pandemic, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, migration debates, the energy crisis, and growing economic uncertainty created an ideal environment for the spread of conspiratorial narratives. During moments of uncertainty, people naturally search for simple explanations for complex developments. Conspiracy movements exploit this need by offering emotionally powerful and easy-to-understand narratives that divide society into categories such as “ordinary people” versus “corrupt elites” or “national sovereignty” versus “foreign control.”
In the European context, EU institutions often become central targets of these narratives. The European Commission, the European Parliament, or Brussels more generally are frequently portrayed as distant, unaccountable, and disconnected from ordinary citizens. This matters because trust is one of the fundamental pillars of democratic governance. Democratic systems do not function only because laws and institutions formally exist. Democracies also depend on citizens believing that institutions operate legitimately and in the public interest. Once this trust begins to erode, the consequences go far beyond online misinformation. Declining institutional trust can contribute to political polarization, radicalization, lower civic participation, and reduced societal resilience during crises.
The EU is particularly vulnerable to these dynamics for several reasons. First, EU governance is highly complex. Decision-making processes involving the European Commission, the Council of the EU, the European Parliament, and various regulatory bodies are often difficult for ordinary citizens to fully understand. This complexity creates an informational gap that conspiracy actors can exploit.
Second, the EU has long faced debates concerning democratic legitimacy and the so-called “democratic deficit.” Conspiracy movements rarely create distrust entirely from scratch. Instead, they amplify existing scepticism, and frustrations already present within society.
Third, the European information environment itself is fragmented. The EU operates across multiple languages, political cultures, and national media ecosystems. This makes coordinated responses to disinformation significantly more complicated than in more centralized states.

What is a conspiracy movement?
Conspiracy movements themselves are highly diverse. Some focus on public health and claim that governments or international organizations manipulate populations through vaccination campaigns or pharmaceutical control. Others revolve around migration, climate policy, digital surveillance, or alleged attempts by “global elites” to destroy national sovereignty.
Despite ideological differences, these movements usually share several common features:
• deep distrust toward institutions,
• rejection of mainstream expertise,
• emotionally charged rhetoric,
• and the belief that hidden actors secretly control political developments.

At the same time, conspiracy movements should not simply be dismissed as irrational or marginal. Their influence often reflects broader societal frustrations and structural problems. Economic insecurity, declining trust in political representation, rapid technological change, and social polarization all contribute to an environment in which conspiratorial explanations can resonate more easily.
This is precisely why conspiracy movements increasingly represent a security issue. Modern security frameworks no longer focus exclusively on military threats. Contemporary understandings of security also include informational resilience, democratic stability, cyber security, and protection against hybrid threats. Within this broader context, conspiracy movements can weaken the informational foundations upon which democratic systems depend.
Now, you may ask ‘What about the consequences of these movements?’, ’How do these movements actually affect us?’.
The aftermath of the actions of these groups is far more alarming than most of us imagine. One of the most visible consequences is the erosion of public trust in EU institutions. Surveys conducted across Europe repeatedly show that trust in institutions varies significantly between member states and fluctuates during periods of crisis. Conspiracy narratives amplify distrust by portraying EU institutions as secretive, manipulative, or fundamentally hostile to ordinary citizens. For example, during the COVID-19 pandemic, conspiracy narratives frequently depicted the European Commission, the World Health Organization, or national governments as parts of a coordinated effort to restrict freedoms and control populations (Islam et al., 2021; Time, 2020; WHO, 2020a; WHO, 2020b). Similar narratives later emerged regarding climate policies, support for Ukraine, and migration governance.
Therefore, the danger lies not only in whether citizens believe specific conspiracy theories. More important is the growing loss of trust in what is true and whom people can rely on for accurate information. Democracy can only function properly when people are able to agree on at least some basic facts about reality. When conspiracy narratives weaken trust in journalists, scientists, public institutions, and democratic processes, society becomes divided into separate groups that each believe different versions of the truth. In such an environment, finding common ground or reaching agreement becomes much harder.
A major reason why this fragmentation deepens so quickly is the structure of today’s digital information environment, especially the growing influence of social media platforms. Social media platforms have played a crucial role in accelerating the spread of conspiracy narratives across Europe. Algorithms on platforms such as Facebook, YouTube, TikTok, or Telegram are designed to prioritize emotionally engaging content because such content generates higher user interaction. Conspiracy narratives are particularly well suited to this environment. They are emotionally provocative, often framed as revelations of hidden truths, and encourage users to distrust mainstream sources of information. As a result, conspiracy content frequently spreads faster and more effectively than nuanced factual explanations.
This dynamic is further strengthened by the architecture of digital communication itself. Social media platforms increasingly create so-called echo chambers, where users are exposed primarily to information confirming their existing beliefs, while opposing viewpoints are gradually filtered out. Over time, these isolated informational environments can deepen political polarization, reinforce radicalization, and intensify distrust toward democratic institutions. Individuals within such communities may gradually begin to perceive EU institutions not as legitimate democratic actors, but as hostile entities threatening national identity, personal freedoms, or traditional values.

When external actors enter the play
The situation becomes even more complicated when foreign influence operations enter the picture. Several European intelligence agencies and cross-continental security analyses have repeatedly warned that authoritarian actors actively exploit conspiracy narratives in order to weaken democratic cohesion within Europe (Council of the European Union, n.d.; Council of the European Union, 2025; NATO, n.d.). Russian disinformation campaigns provide perhaps the clearest example. Since at least the mid-2010s, Russian state-linked actors have systematically promoted narratives designed to undermine trust in NATO, the European Union, liberal democracy, and Western institutions more broadly (ANSA, 2025; AP News, 2025; arXiv, 2018; Royal United Services Institute [RUSI], n.d.).
Importantly, these campaigns do not necessarily aim to convince citizens of one coherent alternative worldview. Their primary objective is often to create confusion, polarization, and distrust. In this strategy, conspiracy narratives become highly effective tools for weakening societal resilience. During the COVID-19 pandemic, pro-Kremlin information channels amplified anti-vaccine conspiracies and narratives portraying European governments as authoritarian (European External Action Service [EEAS], n.d.a; European External Action Service [EEAS], n.d.b). Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, disinformation campaigns increasingly targeted EU’s sanctions, energy policy, and military support for Kyiv, often framing EU leaders as puppets of foreign interests or as intentionally harming their own populations (European Newsroom, 2025; Reuters, 2024).
The interaction between domestic conspiracy movements and foreign influence campaigns creates a particularly dangerous hybrid threat environment. Domestic actors provide local legitimacy and adapt narratives to national political contexts, while foreign actors amplify divisive messages through coordinated online campaigns. Together, they can significantly shape public discourse, especially during periods of political or economic uncertainty. This also causes extremely damaging consequences. Although most people who engage with conspiracy narratives are not extremists or supporters of violence, these movements can still contribute to an environment in which distrust and aggression toward institutions, experts, journalists, and democratic processes becomes increasingly normalized. This pattern became especially visible during anti-COVID protests across several European countries. Demonstrations initially focused on health restrictions often evolved into broader expressions of distrust toward governments, scientists, journalists, and democratic institutions themselves. Similar dynamics can increasingly be observed in debates surrounding migration, climate policy, or European integration.
The danger intensifies once democratic institutions are portrayed not merely as ineffective, but as fundamentally illegitimate or malicious. When citizens begin to view institutions as enemies rather than imperfect democratic structures, support for anti-system political solutions may increase. In extreme cases, this can contribute to political violence or attempts to undermine democratic processes.

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION vs. INFORMATION SECURITY
At the same time, the European Union faces a difficult dilemma in responding to conspiracy movements and disinformation campaigns. Democratic societies must protect freedom of expression, pluralism, and open public debate while simultaneously countering disinformation, foreign manipulation, and hybrid threats. Excessively aggressive regulation risks reinforcing conspiracy narratives claiming that political elites seek to silence dissenting opinions, while measures perceived as censorship can unintentionally deepen distrust and polarization. For this reason, responses focused purely on content removal are unlikely to provide a sufficient long-term solution.
Instead, increasing attention is being placed on strengthening societal resilience through media literacy, transparent institutional communication, support for independent journalism, and rebuilding trust between institutions and citizens. Especially media literacy has become particularly important in the digital age, where citizens face an unprecedented volume of manipulated content, emotionally charged misinformation, and algorithmically amplified narratives. The ability to critically evaluate information sources, identify manipulation techniques, and distinguish credible reporting from conspiratorial speculation is therefore becoming increasingly essential for democratic resilience.
At the same time, the challenge extends beyond misinformation itself. Many individuals engaging with conspiracy narratives are not extremists or foreign agents, but citizens expressing frustration, insecurity, or distrust toward political systems they perceive as distant or unresponsive. Effective responses must therefore balance informational security with the preservation of democratic freedoms and open public discourse

Beyond Fact-Checking: Why Conspiracy Movements Continue to Resonate?
Although media literacy and fact-checking initiatives remain important tools in combating disinformation, they cannot fully address the broader appeal of conspiracy movements. Conspiracy narratives do not spread only because people lack accurate information. In many cases, they resonate because they respond to deeper emotional and social needs. Periods of rapid societal change, economic uncertainty, geopolitical instability, or declining trust in political representation often create feelings of insecurity and alienation. Conspiracy movements can provide individuals with a sense of certainty, identity, and belonging during such periods. They offer simplified explanations for complex developments and create clear divisions between “ordinary people” and perceived enemies or elites. This is why purely rational or fact-based responses frequently fail to address the deeper roots of distrust.
Institutional communication therefore plays a crucial role in shaping public trust. EU institutions are often criticized for communication strategies that appear technocratic, bureaucratic, and disconnected from the everyday concerns of citizens. Complex policy frameworks, institutional jargon, and insufficient engagement with public anxieties can unintentionally reinforce perceptions that Brussels is distant from ordinary people. Conspiracy movements exploit precisely this gap. Narratives portraying EU institutions as elitist or unresponsive become more persuasive when citizens already perceive political communication as inaccessible or detached from reality. Rebuilding trust therefore requires more than simply providing accurate information. It also requires institutional transparency, accountability, responsiveness, and visible engagement with public concerns. Citizens are more likely to trust institutions that communicate openly, acknowledge uncertainty, and demonstrate empathy toward societal anxieties.

Fragmented Information Space Across Europe
Another major challenge lies in the fragmented nature of the European information environment itself. Unlike states with relatively centralized media systems, the European Union operates across multiple languages, political cultures, and national media ecosystems. As a result, conspiracy narratives and disinformation campaigns spread differently across member states, shaped by local political dynamics, historical experiences, and domestic societal tensions.
For example, migration-related conspiracy narratives may resonate more strongly in countries where migration debates are highly polarized, while anti-EU rhetoric may gain traction in regions experiencing economic dissatisfaction or political alienation. This diversity makes coordinated European responses inherently difficult. Measures that prove effective in one member state may be ineffective — or even counterproductive — elsewhere.

The Rise of AI-Generated Disinformation
The rapid evolution of digital technologies further complicates efforts to counter conspiracy movements. Messaging applications decentralized online communities, and alternative media platforms increasingly allow conspiracy actors to operate outside traditional moderation frameworks. Telegram channels, encrypted communication networks, and alternative video-sharing platforms facilitate the rapid spread of conspiratorial narratives with limited oversight.
At the same time, artificial intelligence may intensify these risks even further in the coming years. AI-generated content, including deepfakes, synthetic audio, and automated disinformation campaigns, could significantly increase both the scale and sophistication of conspiracy narratives. As manipulated content becomes increasingly realistic and harder to verify, public trust in digital information may decline even further. This development poses serious risks for democratic governance. Democracies rely on citizens being able to make decisions based on credible information and at least some shared understanding of reality. If informational environments become saturated with manipulation and systemic distrust, democratic deliberation itself becomes increasingly fragile.

The Future of Democratic Resilience in Europe
The future trajectory of conspiracy movements in Europe will likely depend on several interconnected developments, including economic instability, technological transformation, geopolitical crises, and growing political polarization. These factors may continue to create fertile conditions for conspiratorial narratives and declining trust in democratic institutions.
At the same time, stronger institutional transparency, improvements in digital literacy, and growing public awareness of disinformation risks may gradually strengthen societal resilience. The European Union has already introduced several initiatives aimed at countering disinformation and strengthening informational security, including the Digital Services Act, cooperation with online platforms, support for fact-checking initiatives, and strategic communication efforts targeting foreign influence campaigns. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of these measures remains debated, particularly given the speed at which digital informational ecosystems continue to evolve.
The European information space has therefore become not only a battlefield of competing narratives, but also a broader test of democratic resilience. The ability of European societies to preserve trust, maintain open democratic discourse, and resist manipulative informational dynamics may increasingly determine the future stability of European democracy.

List of references
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Written by Rebecca Bednarova

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